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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What is the proper role of cost-benefit analysis in understanding 
the tort concept of negligence or reasonable care?  A straightforward 
question, you might think.  But it is a question that manages to elicit 
groans of exasperation from those on both sides of the controversy. 
For most utilitarians and adherents to law and economics, the 
answer is obvious: to say that people should not be negligent is to 
say that they should minimize the aggregate expected costs of their 
activities—specifically, they should minimize the sum of the costs of 
accidents and the costs of preventing accidents.  In the famous 
Learned Hand formulation, they should take a precaution if, but only 
if, the marginal costs (or “burden,” “B”) of that precaution (in the 
form of the tangible costs of the precaution or the lost benefits that 
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taking the precaution would entail) are less than its marginal benefits 
(in the form of reduced risks of injury, measured by multiplying the 
probability (“P”) of the injury times the magnitude (“L”) of the 
injury if it occurs).  If B>PxL, it would be absurd to require the 
greater expenditure, B. 
For many advocates of a fairness, corrective justice, rights-
based, or contractualist perspective, the opposite answer is equally 
obvious: if we permit a person to impose risks of harm on others 
merely because he would thereby obtain a benefit (or would 
otherwise incur a burden) greater than the discounted value of the 
harm he might inflict, we are authorizing him to dump the costs of 
his risky activities on innocent victims.  To permit this type of 
sacrifice of individuals on the altar of aggregate social welfare is 
morally abhorrent.1 
I will suggest that a more qualified position than either of these 
polar views is more defensible and also more consistent with Anglo-
American tort doctrine.  Before launching into my (perhaps equally 
exasperating) argument for moderation, however, I offer five 
examples and a question, in order to make the controversy more 
concrete. 
1.  Is it better not to save a life so that billions  
may view the World Cup live? 
Consider an example offered by Professor Gregory Keating, 
adapted from an example from philosopher T.M. Scanlon: 
 
WORLD CUP BROADCAST 
Suppose that a piece of transmitting equipment has toppled 
and crushed a television technician helping to broadcast 
[the World Cup live] to a billion viewers worldwide, and 
that the only way to save the technician’s life is to interrupt 
the broadcast for thirty minutes, effectively thwarting the 
transmission of the show . . . .2 
 
 1. “To refuse to mitigate the risk of one’s activity is to treat the world as the dumping 
ground for one’s harmful effects, as if it were uninhabited by other agents.”  ERNEST J. WEINRIB, 
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 152 (1995). 
 2. Gregory Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 653, 666 (2003).  Keating’s actual example is the viewing of Baywatch, but as he points 
out, nothing turns on the low (or high) value of the television show in the example; what matters 
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A utilitarian approach of aggregating total benefits and burdens 
would seem to require that the broadcast not be interrupted.  After 
all, even miniscule individual benefits add up to an enormous 
quantity of social welfare when aggregated over a billion people.  
But this result, that we should not interrupt the broadcast and save 
the technician’s life, appears to be morally abhorrent.  As Keating 
explains: 
Although the number of viewers may be vast, the harm to 
them is not morally comparable to the life of the technician.  
Inconvenience and disappointment are not morally 
comparable to death.  No amount of inconvenience—
distributed across a large number of distinct persons—sums 
to the loss of a single life.3 
2.  May a bus driver use less care when she is  
transporting fewer passengers? 
Here is another example that raises doubts about the moral and 
legal relevance of aggregation—and specifically, about whether, as 
cost-benefit analysis assumes, an aggregate increase or decrease in 
the risk that one poses is always relevant to the permissibility of the 
risk.  Is it really justifiable (holding everything else constant) to 
create a higher level of risk if the number of persons endangered is 
smaller? 
 
 
is that the show is very popular.  The soccer World Cup seems to fit this criterion better than 
Baywatch, which is a less likely candidate today for avid widespread viewing. 
  I will later discuss the original Scanlon example upon which this hypothetical is based; 
some of the differences might be significant.  See infra Part III.C.3. 
 3. Keating, supra note 2.  As stated, the example involves a harm and a set of benefits that 
are certain to occur.  We could readily modify Keating’s example, however, to pose the 
analogous issue of whether it is permissible not to take a precaution against the future risk of such 
a harm, notwithstanding the cost of losing the expected benefits.  Thus, suppose the television 
station is faced with a significant chance, but not with a certainty, that the technician will die 
unless rescued.  Or suppose the technician has not yet been crushed by equipment, but there is a 
significant danger that the equipment will fall on him unless electricity is cut off.  See Alastair 
Norcross, Contractualism and Aggregation, 28 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 303, 310 (2002).  I do not 
believe that these factual differences would significantly alter the intuitive revulsion that most 
observers would feel if the decision were made to continue the broadcast in the face of these 
serious risks. 
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LOUISE, DRIVING A FULL OR ALMOST EMPTY BUS 
Suppose Louise is driving a bus on her usual route.  On 
Monday, the bus is full of passengers.  On Tuesday, it has 
only one.  Is it permissible for her to drive faster on 
Tuesday? 
 
The view that due care depends on an aggregate cost-benefit 
analysis, including the aggregate risks posed by one’s conduct, 
suggests that she may.  If she loses control of the bus, the expected 
harm to passengers is much greater on Monday than on Tuesday.  
Everything else being equal,4 she should take more care to prevent a 
risk of greater aggregate injury, and conversely she may take less 
care to prevent a risk of lesser aggregate injury. 
Yet, this is counterintuitive.  Doesn’t Louise owe each of the 
passengers the same duty of care, the same consideration of his 
interest in safety, without regard to how many other passengers are 
on the bus?5 
 
 4. I am assuming that a greater number of passengers makes no appreciable difference to 
her ability to control the bus. 
 5. This example is intended to express the same essential point as an example posed by 
John Oberdiek: 
If construction regulations were a function of consequentialist interpersonal 
aggregation, it would follow that apartment high-rises would be built to make their 
occupants safer than the occupants of single-family homes.  Equally stringent 
construction regulations would not be justified, on this view, for the simple fact that so 
many more people would be at risk in the high-rise.  This is a striking conclusion, and 
one I believe is mistaken.  Under contractualist intrapersonal aggregation, in contrast, 
equally stringent regulations would in fact be justified.  That any single person would 
face the same probability and level of harm whether in an apartment building or in a 
single family home would be dispositive.  The sheer number of people at risk would be 
irrelevant under intrapersonal aggregation—and that can never be the case when 
employing interpersonal aggregation.  Therefore, the theoretical basis of risk regulation 
does matter.  Whether to ensure the equal safety of all persons or to require different 
levels of safety for different people is a stark choice, and one that risk regulators cannot 
avoid.  The respective options are in turn supported exclusively by rival moral theories.  
And that makes the task of articulating the relevance of moral theory to risk regulation 
quite literally a matter of life and death. 
John Oberdiek, The Ethics in Risk Regulation: Towards a Contractualist Re-Orientation, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 199, 203–04 (2004); see also T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 
236 (1998).  In a footnote, Oberdiek clarifies: 
I am not suggesting that the more specific building codes should be identical for high-
rises and single-family homes.  Different building codes may be justified by a single 
regulatory standard of care.  Surely, high-rises need to be built from stronger materials 
than single-family homes, and in this way conform to stricter building codes, in order 
to ensure occupants of the former the same level of safety as occupants of the latter. 
Oberdiek, supra, at 204 n.14. 
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3.  Is it permissible to impose greater risks on the poor? 
In a commendable display of candor, Judge Richard Posner 
identifies a possible difficulty with his wealth maximization account 
of tort law, which, roughly speaking, is a particular version of the 
utilitarian approach:6 
 
DRIVING FASTER IN A POOR NEIGHBORHOOD 
Wealth maximization “[implies] that a person should feel 
free to drive faster in a poor than in a wealthy neighborhood 
because expected accident costs are on average lower in the 
former . . . .”7  After all, “the magnitude of the loss if an 
accident occurs [is] a function in part of the income of the 
victim[], making the optimal expenditure of time and other 
resources on avoiding accidents in the poor neighborhood 
also lower.”8 
 
These three examples support the intuition that aggregating costs 
and benefits of risky conduct is a morally objectionable way to 
determine when that conduct is permissible.  Now consider two 
examples suggesting the contrary, that such aggregation is morally 
acceptable or even morally required. 
4.  Is high-speed driving unjustifiable because it sacrifices  
lives for mere convenience? 
Philosopher Alastair Norcross offers the following example: 
 
HIGH-SPEED DRIVING (LIVES FOR CONVENIENCE) 
The current speed limits on high-speed roads of 55 miles 
per hour (“mph”) (or more) predictably result in a large 
number of accidental deaths that could be avoided if we 
significantly lowered the speed limits.  Yet the justification 
of the higher speed limits seems to be a widespread but 
 
 6. I say “roughly speaking” because wealth-maximization shares with a utilitarian account 
a requirement of aggregation and an insensitivity to the distribution of risk, harm, and benefit.  
However, as defended by its leading exponent, this account treats wealth as a narrower concept 
than social welfare.  See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical 
Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
 7. Id. at 110. 
 8. Id. 
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slight social benefit: the simple convenience of reaching 
one’s destination more quickly. 
 
However, as Norcross points out, “We are not morally obligated 
to impose a national speed limit of 50 mph (or less).”9 
Most people would agree, and do not believe that automobile 
drivers should drive extremely slowly (or not at all), even though we 
can predict with statistical certainty that slowing down will greatly 
reduce the number of accidental deaths, and even if the only benefit 
that drivers obtain from their greater speed is simple convenience.10  
Yet, the intuitive plausibility of the principle that lives may be traded 
off for mere convenience when we are establishing highway speed 
limits seems to suggest that consequentialist aggregation is more 
generally permissible, a position that is much harder to defend.  
Indeed, Norcross further argues that if the “High-Speed Driving 
(Lives for Convenience)” principle is correct, then we are committed 
to other positions that are intuitively much less plausible, such as: 
 
LIFE FOR HEADACHES 
“There is some finite number of headaches, such that it is 
permissible to kill an innocent person to avoid them.”11 
 
Readers familiar with a recent article by Cass Sunstein and 
Adrian Vermeule in defense of the death penalty12 will notice a 
similar argumentative strategy.  The authors point to recent studies 
 
 9. Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 135, 160 (1997) [hereinafter Norcross, Comparing Harms]; Alastair Norcross, Speed Limits, 
Human Lives, and Convenience: A Reply to Ridge, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 59 (1998).  Norcross’s 
actual example is “highway” driving, but I have changed it to “high-speed” driving in order to 
emphasize that a substantial number of the victims of such driving do not benefit from it in any 
realistic sense.  On a divided highway, as opposed to a high-speed road that passes through 
residential areas, it is much more likely that virtually all of the victims are drivers or passengers 
who in some sense benefit from the activity of speedy driving. 
 10. Norcross, Comparing Harms, supra note 9, at 159. 
 11. Id.  Precisely how an intentional killing would prevent innumerable headaches is not 
specified.  Perhaps the victim’s heart contains a rare type of cell that is the only possible headache 
cure?  Or perhaps the victim’s life-saving supply of antibiotics, if taken from him and 
redistributed, would save a billion people from headaches.  See Alastair Norcross, Great Harms 
from Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches, 58 ANALYSIS 152, 
152 (1998). 
 12. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? 
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005). 
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suggesting that imposing the death penalty for murder has a 
substantial deterrent effect.  If these studies are valid, they argue, 
then the government is morally obliged to impose the death penalty, 
just as the government is morally obliged to take affirmative 
precautions through regulation and others means (including tort law) 
to assure the safety and health of its citizens.13  Norcross, Sunstein 
and Vermeule are willing to bite the bullet and accept the more 
controversial conclusion (the state has a duty to kill an innocent to 
prevent many headaches, and a duty to execute murderers), based on 
their belief in the inexorable logic of consequentialism.  Are they 
correct?  Or, if they are wrong, and if “High-speed driving (lives for 
convenience)” is morally distinguishable from this parade of 
horribles (including the “World Cup” example), how do we draw and 
defend the distinction? 
5.  Is it unjustifiable to sell a product that is convenient  
and useful but unusually dangerous? 
 
SUB-SUBCOMPACT AUTOMOBILE 
Suppose an automobile manufacturer sells an extremely 
small automobile for its convenience to urban drivers 
interested in parking in very small spaces.  (Examples 
include the Smart Fortwo, recently introduced in the United 
States;14 and the extremely basic Tata Nano,15 recently 
introduced in India.)  Although part of the car’s attraction is 
its low price, another significant benefit is its tiny size.  At 
the same time, that size also makes the passengers 
significantly more susceptible to physical harm in the event 
 
 13. See id. at 721–22 (arguing that for ordinary torts, the act-omission distinction is 
meaningless, since whatever government does or fails to do, the act or omission will support the 
entitlement of one or the other party in the dispute). 
 14. See Alistair Weaver, First Drive: 2008 Smart Fortwo, EDMONDS INSIDE LINE, Feb. 21, 
2007, http://www.edmunds.com/insideline/do/Drives/First Drives/articleId=119682.  The car, 
produced by DaimlerAG, is only 106 inches long. 
 15. See Sharon Silke Carty, Tiny Tata Has All of Detroit Talking, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2008-01-15-nano_N.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 
2008).  The Tata Nano, produced by Tata Motors, will retail for about $2,500 (but is sixteen 
inches longer than the Smart Fortwo).  It is designed as a safer replacement for mopeds. “In the 
developed world, we kind of miss the point,” says Rick Wagoner, the CEO of General Motors.  
Id.  “We think, ‘How would that car do in a crash test?’ But we miss the point that it’s better than 
being in a crash in a two-wheeler.”  Id. 
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of a collision with another automobile or with a roadside 
hazard. 
 
Is it unjustifiable to sell an automobile with a design that some 
consumers find attractive because of its convenience and usefulness, 
even though the design is unusually dangerous?  Although the 
benefits to consumers are relatively modest, and spread relatively 
widely, the “costs” in the form of serious injury and death will be 
very severe and suffered by only very few.  Nevertheless, the activity 
of selling such a product intuitively seems perfectly acceptable. 
Finally, the clash of moral intuitions revealed by the earlier 
examples is on vivid display when we confront the following 
question: 
6.  Is it wrongful for a potential injurer to explicitly consider the 
costs and benefits of taking a precaution? 
Consider the following result of research conducted by Professor 
Kip Viscusi: 
 
CORPORATE RISK ANALYSIS AS A RECKLESS ACT 
When mock jurors are confronted with hypothetical 
examples of companies that conduct explicit cost-benefit 
studies to decide whether to adopt a precaution, they are 
much more likely to impose punitive damages if the 
company has conducted such a study, even when its 
decision is cost-justified and is therefore (arguably) non-
negligent, than if the company has not conducted such a 
study, even when its decision is not cost-justified, i.e., is 
negligent.16 
 
Similarly, Gary Schwartz, in his article examining the famous 
(or infamous) Ford Pinto litigation, noted that defense lawyers shy 
away from the argument that a cost-benefit analysis justifies a 
company’s decision not to take a safety precaution, for they 
recognize that the argument can expose their client not only to 
 
 16. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 
588 (2000) (reporting results of mock juror analysis showing that “undertaking any type of risk 
analysis was harmful to the corporation’s prospects both with respect to the probability of 
punitive damages and, more importantly, with respect to the magnitude of the award”). 
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compensatory but also to punitive damages.17  The lesson that many 
people take from the Pinto case itself is that the very act of engaging 
in cost-benefit analysis displays morally reprehensible callousness.18 
But if the previous two examples are correct in suggesting that 
aggregate benefits to many (even in the form of mere convenience) 
can justify aggregate costs to a few (even in the form of serious 
injury or death), then what is wrong with an individual or corporation 
explicitly invoking this type of justification?  If lay jurors find the 
justification morally abhorrent, who is right? 
This Article is organized as follows.  After reviewing the scope 
and assumptions of the argument, and the underlying philosophical 
perspectives, I examine and reject two types of unqualified views 
(simple forms of consequentialist balancing and also deontological 
views that reject all tradeoffs between values).  I then endorse two 
families of qualified views, one consequentialist, the other 
deontological.  The conclusion suggests that the Learned Hand test is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate both sets of qualified views and 
addresses the question how we might choose between a qualified 
consequentialist and a qualified deontological account. 
II.  SOME CLARIFICATIONS 
A.  Scope and Assumptions 
This Article focuses on the proper analysis of the moral and 
legal concept of negligence.  Strict liability is considered only 
peripherally. 
Although this Article pays some attention to the descriptive 
question of how the law actually defines negligence, the emphasis is 
on how negligence should be understood, and on underlying 
justifications and principles.  Only brief attention is given to 
institutional questions (such as the role of judge and jury in 
articulating negligence), questions that are of course quite important 
for the law to resolve. 
 
 17. Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1038 
(1991). 
 18. See id. at 1035–37, 1043–45 (collecting numerous sources supporting this proposition); 
see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (expressing moral objections to cost-benefit 
analysis as it is usually conducted). 
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The paper concentrates on injurer rather than victim negligence, 
on advertent rather than inadvertent negligence, and on misfeasance 
cases. 
I view negligence to be a species of fault, of deficient conduct, 
of conduct that should have been otherwise.19  Furthermore, 
negligence liability is, I believe, best understood as expressing a 
primary duty not to act negligently.  Negligence liability is not 
merely a pricing mechanism.  In Robert Cooter’s terminology, it is a 
sanction, not a price.20  I will, however, discuss consequentialist 
views that do not presuppose these understandings of negligence. 
In this Article, I say little about consent and assumption of risk.  
These are important issues in tort law, but they are not the focus here 
because they do not play a necessary role in justifying risk in our 
legal system, nor is it plausible that they could do so.  To be sure, 
Kantians sometimes emphasize the impermissibility of harming 
others unless they consent; one could similarly argue that risking 
harm to others is always impermissible unless they have consented to 
the risk.  But the argument is too broad to be plausible: innumerable 
risky activities are tolerated in the contemporary world even though 
it is unrealistic to claim or expect that all those exposed to the risk 
(including bystanders and even children) subjectively “consent” in 
any meaningful sense of the term.  As we will see, however, we 
should (and realistically can) ask a broader, but structurally similar 
question: whether those exposed to a risk sufficiently benefit from 
the risky activity.21 
 
 19. See Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 52, 54-57 (1999)  
 20. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524, 1538–40 (1984). 
 21. This is not to say that subjective consent or assumption of risk is irrelevant to 
permissibility.  To the contrary, I think a pluralistic account of tort law is plausible, one that 
considers consent, autonomy, special relationships, social roles, reliance, expectations, and a 
number of other values in determining the existence and scope of a legal duty and the 
permissibility of a risk.  See Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 273, 284 (1996) [hereinafter Simons, Deontology]; Kenneth W. Simons, 
Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698, 737 (1996) (reviewing. WEINRIB, supra 
note 1) [hereinafter Simons, Justification].  For other pluralist accounts of tort law, see Bruce 
Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Toward a Reasonable Accommodation, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Izhak Englard, The 
Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 6; Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg & Zipursky’s 
Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1557 (2006).  See also JOHN KEKES, THE 
MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993) (defending a pluralist view of moral values). 
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What is “risk”?  This is an important and complicated topic, 
carefully explored by Matthew Adler22 and Stephen Perry,23 among 
others.  For the purposes of this essay, I will simply assume an 
epistemic conception, characterized essentially as the risks that a 
reasonable person would deem sufficiently important to be relevant 
to whether to take a precaution.  I do not believe that any of the 
arguments in this essay turn on the question of how risk is properly 
characterized for purposes of understanding negligence. (I will, 
however, address the significance of the distinction between 
individual and population risk.) 
Finally, this essay examines how negligence should be 
understood in light of underlying normative justifications for tort 
law, not in light of how tort law performs the functions of deterrence, 
compensation, and loss-spreading.24 
This essay is largely normative, though I believe it also offers a 
plausible description of much of tort practice.  It is part of a larger 
project in which I suggest that a nuanced version of the Learned 
Hand test is both morally attractive and a credible interpretation of 
 
 22. See Matthew Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk 
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005); Matthew Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The 
Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293 (2003). 
 23. See Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm, Interests, and Rights, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 190 (Tim Lewens ed., 2007). 
 24. “Deterrence,” “compensation” and “loss-spreading” are often described as justifications 
of tort law.  However, the better view is that they are simply functions, effects or constitutive 
parts of tort law.  The question of justification runs deeper.  See Kenneth W. Simons, The 
Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719 
(2008).  With respect to compensation, why must the injurer compensate the victim?  Because the 
victim has a right to recovery, as a matter of corrective justice?  Or because he has a right to 
recourse?  See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 
MD. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (2005); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 746 (2003).  If deterrence of risky behavior occurs as a result of tort liability, 
does this serve at least as a partial justification of tort liability?  If so, this could be because we 
wish to deter inefficient behavior (a utilitarian approach), because we wish to deter rights-
violations (a broader consequentialist approach), or because we endorse a mixed approach 
encompassing both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist values in which one goal is the 
minimization of rights-violations.  See Gary Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming 
Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1831 (1997).  And, if we applaud 
the loss-spreading function of tort law, we might do so because the function operates as an 
efficient form of insurance, or instead because of a fairness-based principle, that those who 
benefit from an activity, service, act, or product, should in fairness pay for at least some of the 
predictable injury costs that the activity inflicts on participants, users or bystanders.  See Stephen 
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 613–16 (1985). 
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tort practice.25  To be sure, there is much controversy about the 
descriptive claim that the Hand test reflects Anglo-American tort 
law.  Jury instructions (except in some products liability cases) rarely 
refer to Hand balancing,26 and appellate decisions refer to such 
balancing only intermittently.27  Rather, “reasonable care under the 
circumstances” appears to be the (remarkably vague and opaque) 
“standard” that many jurisdictions require juries to apply in 
determining negligence.28  In the conclusion, I endorse a more 
systematic, disciplined analysis of negligence than this standard 
provides. 
B.  Philosophical Framework:  
Consequentialism v. Nonconsequentialism;  
Individual Moral Duty v. Global Perspective 
The broad underlying normative principles that will receive 
discussion in this essay are consequentialism (especially 
utilitarianism) and nonconsequentialism (especially such 
deontological principles as corrective justice, “fairness,” and 
contractualism).  But we also must attend to two distinct ways of 
understanding the point of a legal duty not to be negligent (and the 
associated duty to pay damages if one is negligent).  Is the point to 
express or reinforce an individual moral duty not to be negligent?  Or 
is the point to express or implement a more global consequentialist 
(or nonconsequentialist) vision, of which the individual duty is just 
one part? 
The debate between consequentialism and deontology restates, 
at a more fundamental philosophical level, the two competing modes 
of exasperation noted in the introduction at a more fundamental 
philosophical level.  For consequentialists, more welfare is better 
 
 25. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001) [hereinafter 
Simons, Hand Formula]; Simons, supra note 19; Simons, Deontology, supra note 21. 
 26. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A 
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 587, 619 (2002); Michael Wells, 
Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. 
L. REV. 725, 735 (1992); Benjamin Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 
2013–17 (2007). 
 27. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the 
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 843 (2001). 
 28. See sources cited in supra note 26; see also Ken Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 1187 (2001) (underscoring the vagueness problem with negligence standards). 
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than less.29  Who in their right mind would want less?  For 
deontologists, some actions are intrinsically wrong, or a violation of 
rights, even if they would secure more welfare.  Who would 
seriously reject this common sense perspective?30 
Utilitarianism (in its familiar law and economics version) is the 
form of consequentialism that is most frequently invoked as a 
rationale for the institution, and the particular doctrines, of tort law.  
But a consequentialist (or specifically utilitarian) analysis can 
interpret tort liability for negligence in two distinct ways. 
First, it could view the legal duty not to be negligent, and to pay 
damages for negligence, as expressing or reinforcing an individual 
moral duty not to create unjustifiable risks.  And it would spell out 
the moral duty in purely consequentialist terms: an actor has created 
an unjustifiable risk just in case the ex ante costs of taking a 
precaution against creating the risk are less than the ex ante benefits 
of the precaution, with costs and benefits defined in a purely 
consequentialist (or specifically utilitarian) way. 
Second, a consequentialist might instead specify the scope of the 
legal duty not to be negligent by reference not merely to the risks 
that it would be justified or unjustified for an individual to take, but 
also to the other, second-order costs and benefits of employing the 
individual-focused legal rule.  This global approach might sometimes 
still require a legal liability rule of negligence, but it also might 
require strict liability, or no liability, or varying versions of the 
standard negligence criterion, depending on the context.31  The 
 
 29. See Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 
1988) (“[A]ll [consequentialists] share. . .a very simple and seductive idea: namely, that so far as 
morality is concerned, what people ought to do is to minimize evil and maximize good, to try, in 
other words, to make the world as good a place as possible.”); see also LOUIS KAPLAN & STEVEN 
M. SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21–23, 62–81 (2002) (arguing that “fairness” 
principles should not be applied as independent evaluative criteria for social decision-making, but 
can play a subsidiary role in welfare-based criteria, insofar as people often have a “taste” for 
fairness and insofar as notions of fairness sometimes are good proxies for social norms that 
promote social welfare). 
 30. See Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 29, at 2. 
 31. Here are two examples of a disjunction between the individual and global approaches. 
  First, suppose that the individually optimal conduct is to: “Drive five mph over the speed 
limit except when a slower speed would obviously be required because of unusually heavy traffic 
conditions.”  But further suppose that the following simpler rule is much easier to monitor and 
enforce: “Drive no faster than the speed limit, and always be found non-negligent if you do so.”  
Then this rule (requiring greater care than what individual optimality would require) is now 
globally optimal in light of all costs and benefits. 
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optimal global approach will also depend on the costs and benefits of 
each type of tort liability rule (taking into account error, institutional, 
and other costs), and on the cost-effectiveness of alternative legal 
approaches (including criminal law and regulation).32 
Why does this distinction matter?  Because these two different 
consequentialist approaches require very different types of analysis.  
A person who fails properly to weigh the expected utilitarian costs 
and benefits of his actions is arguably subject to blame for not 
properly considering the effects of his actions on others.  Here we 
see the Kantian strand within utilitarianism.  This strand is a coherent 
understanding of negligence, even if a social judgment of blame or a 
legal sanction such as a liability rule will have little or no effect on 
future conduct (of that person or others). 
The global approach is quite different.  Here, a primary reason 
for the legal rule of liability for negligence is to induce optimal care.  
At the same time, the global approach has to consider the costs and 
benefits of using tort law (or other legal or social sanctions) to 
stimulate potential injurers to act carefully.  Thus, although the 
“optimal” care that the global approach actually recommends might 
turn out to be the same standard of care that the individual duty 
approach would require, it might also be some other level of care that 
is socially optimal in light of other costs and benefits of trying to 
induce a suitable level of care and in light of other effects on social 
welfare. 
In the Anglo-American common law tradition, when courts 
judge whether there is sufficient evidence of an actor’s negligence, 
sometimes they emphasize the need to balance the advantage and 
disadvantage of taking a precaution.  In so doing, they often 
 
  But conversely, the global approach sometimes requires less care than the individual 
norm does.  Suppose that a rule of legal liability in a particular context would be so likely to 
discourage desirable activity that it is better not to impose liability even on types of conduct that 
are suboptimal.  For example, assume, as some utilitarians say, that it is optimal for  an individual 
to perform a rescue if the burden of rescuing is less than the expected benefits to the potential 
victim.  Yet a legal rule of liability for not rescuing might discourage some people from visiting 
locations (for example, the beach or ski slopes) where others might need rescue.  See RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 191 (7th ed. 2007).  (This empirical claim seems 
doubtful to me, but let us assume that it is established.)  Accordingly, a very limited legal duty of 
easy rescue might ultimately be optimal in light of these further negative incentives, even if what 
utilitarianism really demands is a duty to rescue whenever the direct expected benefits of rescuing 
exceed the direct costs. 
 32. See Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 274–75.  For a similar contrast, see LIAM 
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 23 (2002). 
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articulate the first type of consequentialist calculus, which 
determines whether the actor breached an individual moral duty to 
use reasonable care.  But they are not necessarily endorsing a more 
global consequentialist judgment that legal liability in such a case is 
socially optimal.  That is, we only occasionally see courts explicitly 
mention the deterrent effects of negligence rules.  I conjecture that 
courts sympathetic to a consequentialist understanding of individual 
tort duties would continue to apply an individual, consequentialist 
calculus even if they were certain that the application of this criterion 
of negligence would not have any significant effect on whether 
actors in the future use reasonable care.33 
Within nonconsequentialist views, such as deontological views, 
again it is valuable to distinguish between an individual moral duty 
not to create unreasonable or unjustifiable risks, and a more global 
perspective.  Sometimes the law imposes liability on a person not 
merely to express or reinforce the wrongfulness of his breaching an 
individual moral duty to use reasonable care, but also (or instead) to 
embody or promote other nonconsequentialist values, such as 
corrective justice, retributive justice, distributive justice, or respect 
for rights.34 (Thus, one straightforward nonconsequentialist 
justification for punitive damages is to add a retributive sanction to 
especially blameworthy conduct.)  And sometimes the law declines 
to impose liability for a breach of individual moral duty when 
liability would conflict with other nonconsequentialist principles. 
(For example, some nonconsequentialists believe that the moral 
principle of beneficence requires rescue, but that the law should not 
enforce that duty because enforcement would seriously infringe a 
political value, autonomy to pursue one’s own ends.) 
 
 33. See Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 278.  For example, a global consequentialist 
approach might support imposing tort or even criminal liability on those who do not lock their 
cars, while imposing no or very light tort and criminal law sanctions on car thieves, if this would 
better prevent theft and resulting injuries).  Cf. Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and 
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 340 (1984) 
(pointing out that raising the penalty for unauthorized use of a car or imposing criminal liability 
on owners who leave their car unlocked may prove equally effective in reducing the number of 
car thefts).  Here, the individual moral duty is quite complicated to articulate: must the individual 
calculate who else can take care, and how burdensome that would be?  It might, however, be 
globally optimal to impose liability here, without regard to the feasibility of specifying the 
individual duty. 
 34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965). 
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One context that highlights the difference between these 
perspectives is the (supposed) problem of overprecaution.  On its 
face, utilitarianism offers a dubious analysis of the problem of 
overprecaution, for the theory suggests that it is morally wrong to 
take a greater precaution if a lesser precaution would be 
economically optimal.  “Under the utilitarian-efficiency theory, it is 
as inefficient to be above the optimal level of care as to be below it: 
either form of divergence therefore should be considered 
negligent.”35  To be sure, the global consequentialist approach to tort 
liability normally need not create a special incentive rule to address 
this problem.  Normally, the injurer will absorb the costs of excess 
precaution, and ordinarily, this will provide him with sufficient 
incentive not to overinvest in safety.36  Still, the consequentialist 
account of individual moral duty remains problematic. 
A nonconsequentialist account of tort duties will address the 
problem of overprecaution differently from the utilitarian account 
and, I believe, more persuasively.  The nonconsequentialist will not 
see overprecaution as a general problem.  If a generously inclined 
potential injurer decides to minimize the risks to others more than is 
required by the individual moral duty not to be negligent (whether 
that duty is understood in utilitarian or nonutilitarian terms), arguably 
she deserves praise for her beneficence, not moral criticism.  For 
example, if someone decides to drive extremely slowly (without 
thereby hindering any other drivers) in order to minimize risks to 
others, she hardly deserves moral blame.37 
 
 35. Richard Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 6; see also Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021547.  Indeed, in an early article, 
Richard Posner suggested that aversion to waste or to the squandering of resources was the moral 
defect underlying the efficiency account of tort law.  Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–35 (1972). 
 36. See Perry, supra note 35, at 11; see also Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
243, 246 (2007) (arguing, on incentive grounds, that tortfeasors should only be liable for the net 
risks created by their wrongdoing, after offsetting the risks that their conduct reduced from the 
risks that their conduct increased). 
 37. The utilitarian might reply: her slow driving demonstrates either (1) that she places very 
little value on getting to her destination quickly, or (2) that she obtains private psychic benefits 
from being considerate to others.  Accordingly, her driving slowly is what the utilitarian calculus 
recommends, after all. 
The first reply is one, but not the only, possible explanation: perhaps she cares as much as 
most other drivers do about getting to her destination quickly, but she cares about the welfare of 
others even more than most people do.  The second reply is inadequate and often disingenuous.  
First, it is a contentious question whether the most defensible conception of utilitarianism in the 
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Of course, the general question of when an individual moral 
duty should be enforced by a legal duty or sanction (and whether it 
should be enforced through tort liability, regulation, or criminal 
liability) is complex.  I cannot say much about the issue here.38  But it 
is important to see that how we understand negligence, on either a 
consequentialist or nonconsequentialist account, greatly depends on 
whether we focus largely on the individual duty to exercise 
reasonable care, or instead on the place of that duty within a larger 
institutional structure designed either to promote good consequences 
more generally or to embody nonconsequentialist values such as 
rights, corrective justice, and distributive justice. 
III.  REJECTION OF UNQUALIFIED VIEWS 
In this section, I suggest that two approaches to understanding 
negligence are both highly implausible: (1) unqualified 
consequentialist cost-benefit balancing and (2) an unqualified 
deontological rejection of all tradeoffs between values.  First, 
however, I briefly examine and dispose of a seductive 
consequentialist argument to the effect that nonconsequentialism 
cannot explain why risky conduct is impermissible. 
A.  A Preliminary Point: “Risk” Analysis  
Need Not be Consequentialist 
Some commentators claim that the moral and legal analysis of 
negligence must turn on consequentialist, not nonconsequentialist, 
principles, because negligence by definition involves taking an 
unjustified risk, that is, a risk that a future bad consequence (such as 
physical harm to person or property) might occur.39  The claim is 
 
context of tort liability standards would encompass psychic benefits of this sort within “utility.”  
Second, this type of reply is too convenient, for it is available in any case where the 
nonconsequentialist analysis differs from the utilitarian analysis.  Take any case in which the 
utilitarian approach would suggest that a precaution should not be taken, notice that the actual 
actor did take the precaution, then explain his doing so by attributing to him a private taste or 
preference (that taking the precaution will satisfy) sufficiently weighty to move the needle on the 
“Do I take a precaution?” balance from no to yes.  Unless one has independent grounds for 
believing that people only act for reasons of utility, this method of reconstructing reasons for 
action is question-begging. 
 38. For helpful recent discussions in the context of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on 
Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1585–88 (2006). 
 39. See, e.g., Heidi Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262 (1996). 
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mistaken.  To be sure, we do need to examine the immediate 
potential consequences of the injurer’s actions to determine whether, 
ex ante, the risk was permissible or justifiable.  But the ultimate 
rationale for either moral or legal sanction of such risky conduct 
could depend on either consequentialist or nonconsequentialist 
considerations.40 
One way to see the fallacy in this argument is by examining the 
analogous issue that arises with the privilege of self-defense and with 
other justification defenses, such as necessity.  Whether an actor can 
permissibly act in self-defense depends on “risks” in just the same 
sense that risk is relevant in negligence doctrine.  In self-defense, the 
relevant risks include the probability that the assailant will cause 
serious injury or death if not resisted, the probability that the actor’s 
defensive force will cause serious injury or death, and the probability 
that the actor’s use of a lesser degree of force would be equally 
effective.  One might plausibly assert, for example, that if the 
unlawful assailant is posing at least a nontrivial risk of killing the 
actor, then the actor is entitled to use defensive force even if he 
believes it is highly probable that the only force at his disposal will 
kill the assailant.  And yet it is perfectly clear that one can provide 
intelligible nonconsequentialist as well as consequentialist accounts 
of the right to use self-defense.41 
A related but similarly unpersuasive argument proceeds from the 
controversial assumption that all deontological requirements are 
categorical prohibitions.  On that assumption, and because risks are 
pervasive and are sometimes justifiable and sometimes not, 
deontological principles cannot explain when it is permissible to 
impose risks.  Many deontologists, however, reject the assumption: 
they endorse noncategorical principles, including threshold 
deontology.42  Again, even standard doctrines of self-defense (which 
 
 40. See Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 298–99; Simons, Hand Formula, supra note 
25, at 908–16; see also Stephen Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 21, at 72, 80 (stating that “a theory of 
corrective justice and tort law is not, merely by virtue of focusing on outcomes rather than on 
actions as such, necessarily consequentialist in nature”). 
 41. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 206–09 (3d ed. 2006) 
(identifying four theories underlying defenses of justification, such as self-defense, two of 
which—“moral forfeiture” and “moral rights”—are nonconsequentialist). 
 42. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 4 (2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ 
(distinguishing the varieties of threshold deontology). 
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deontologists routinely endorse) contain probabilistic and 
noncategorical elements.43 
B.  Reject Simple Cost-Benefit  
Consequentialist Views 
This section briefly identifies problems with wealth-
maximization as a normative ideal, with simple preference-
satisfaction versions of utilitarianism, and with even idealized 
versions of utilitarianism if they place no constraints on aggregation. 
1.  Reject wealth-maximization  
as a normative ideal 
Posner’s introductory example of speeding in a poor 
neighborhood is a telling objection to a wealth-maximization model.  
Just because the poor have lower wealth and income and thus will 
receive less compensation for injury when compensation is based in 
significant part on lost income, it hardly follows that they value their 
health and safety less than the affluent.  Indeed, Posner himself has 
backed away from the normative claim that he originally made for 
his wealth-maximization position, the claim that wealth itself is a 
social value that ought to be maximized.44  Moreover, federal 
agencies, in the analogous context of government regulation, use an 
invariant figure for the monetized value of a statistical life, and do 
not modify the figure based on a prediction of the wealth of the 
expected victim.45 
A wealth-maximization account is also problematic insofar as it 
offers an illusion of precision, implausibly suggesting a rigorous, 
mathematical formula for determining the justifiability of risks.  One 
imagines a corporate accountant methodically inputting the various 
probabilities of harm and benefit into a spreadsheet; if the costs are 
$1,000,001 and the benefits are $1,000,000, then he will instruct the 
 
 43. Perry, supra note 40, at 79 (arguing that “Hurd embraces too narrow a conception of 
non-consequentialism” insofar as she insists that non-consequentialist prohibitions must be 
categorical); see also Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 290–92. 
 44. Ronald Dworkin’s powerful retort to Posner’s wealth-maximization approach ultimately 
convinced Posner that a wealth-maximization approach can only be justified on pragmatic 
grounds, not as an independent, normatively attractive approach.  See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth 
a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 192 (1980); Posner, supra note 6, at 101. 
 45. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 130 (2006).  The authors clarify that “[agencies] use a range, but they do not make 
their choice within the range depend on the wealth of the victim.”  Id. at 217 n.17. 
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engineers or product designers not to add the safety feature.  But as 
Learned Hand himself acknowledged long ago, this type of precision 
is illusory.46  At the same time, the pretense that a straightforward 
equation can accommodate all the necessary values for determining 
the permissibility of risk-creation might itself contribute to the 
popular misconception that any form of explicit analysis of tradeoffs 
is cold-bloodedly inhuman. 
2.  Reject any simple preference- 
satisfaction version of utilitarianism 
Some advocates of economic analysis of law simply take it for 
granted that social welfare must be understood as the aggregate sum 
of “utility” defined as the satisfaction of human preferences.  But this 
is only one possible understanding of utility, and a controversial 
one.47 
Consider this example, from the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
[I]n certain negligence cases there may be burdens of risk 
prevention that courts properly discount or decline to 
acknowledge.  For example, certain motorists—though 
hoping for and expecting a favorable outcome—may find it 
exciting to race a railroad train towards a highway crossing.  
Yet because society many not recognize that excitement as 
appropriate, it may be ignored by the jury in considering 
whether the motorist should have driven more 
conservatively.48 
The point that private preferences do not automatically count as 
elements of social utility is an important one.  Preferences must be 
 
 46. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 47. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 45, at 28–30; Jules Coleman, The Grounds of 
Welfare, 112 YALE L. J. 1511, 1524–25 (2003) (noting that the analysis in LOUIS KAPLOW & 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), sometimes treats the superiority of 
“welfare” over “fairness” in this essentially tautological way: values of “fairness” matter to the 
rightness of an action or the justice of an institution only insofar as people have a taste or 
preference for fairness).   
  Coleman also points out the crucial ambiguity in the idea that preference-satisfaction is 
valuable: this could be a logical claim, that welfare consists of the satisfaction of preferences; or 
instead a psychological claim, that satisfying preferences typically brings psychological or some 
other type of hedonic benefit to the person holding the preference.  Coleman, supra, at 1541–43. 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 cmt. 4, at 44 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).  The example is taken from Gregory Keating, Reasonableness 
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 369 (1996). 
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“laundered” and “idealized” if they are to be a defensible element of 
a social utility function that is implemented as a legal norm.49 
3. Reject even idealized versions of utilitarianism  
if they place no constraints on aggregation 
The modifications suggested thus far do not go far enough, 
however.  The idealized version of utilitarianism still permits trivial 
benefits for a very large number of persons to outweigh enormous 
costs (such as death or serious personal injury) to a few.  It still 
permits the television station in the introductory World Cup example 
not to save the endangered worker if the aggregate benefits to 
television viewers are great enough.  (Consequentialists do have 
some ways to address this problem, as we will see below.) 
To be sure, an apparently egalitarian norm is contained within 
all utilitarian views: each person’s utility counts equally.  But that 
norm does not answer the objection to unrestricted aggregation.  A 
comment by Stephen Perry is instructive here.  The Draft 
Restatement (Third) of Torts offers this explanation of what it claims 
to be a corrective justice rationale for tort liability: 
The defendant who permits conduct to impose on others a 
risk of harm that exceeds the burden the defendant would 
bear in avoiding that risk is evidently a party who ranks 
personal interests or welfare ahead of the interests or 
welfare of others.  This conduct violates the ethical norm of 
equal consideration, and a tort award seeks to remedy this 
violation.50 
Perry points out that this argument expresses 
the problematic idea that treating interests equally amounts 
to treating persons equally.  After all, if you impose a cost-
justified risk on someone else, you get to keep the benefits 
of the action while the other person incurs the costs.  That 
 
 49. This is especially true if preference-satisfaction is treated as relevant to a 
consequentialist calculus that purports to justify an individual moral duty of reasonable care.  On 
the other hand, insofar as the legal negligence rule is designed to be part of a global 
consequentialist calculus, all of the actor’s private preferences might bear on how great a sanction 
is needed to deter him. 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GEN. PRINCIPLES § 4 cmt. j (Discussion Draft 1999).  
The most recent draft employs very similar language.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005). 
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does not look very much like the application of a norm of 
equal consideration.51 
C.  Reject Deontological Views That Reject  
All Tradeoffs Between Values 
Just as we should reject unqualified consequentialist views, we 
should reject unqualified deontological views that forbid any 
tradeoffs between values.  Any plausible analysis of the justifiability 
of risky conduct must consider both the advantages and the 
disadvantages of taking a precaution.  This feature of risk analysis 
does not commit one to a purely consequentialist account of 
negligence. 
Consider some straightforward examples where tradeoffs must 
be permitted.  Suppose that taking a precaution would avoid a risk to 
group A but then would increase the risk even more to group B, and 
suppose that neither group has a greater moral claim on D.  Then the 
risk to B would be a decisive reason not to take the precaution.  As 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains: 
In certain situations, if the actor takes steps to reduce one 
set of injury risks, this would involve the burden or 
disadvantage of creating a different set of injury risks, and 
these other risks are included within the burden of 
precautions.  For example, if the motorist takes the 
precaution of surveying the area next to the highway in 
order to identify livestock or animals that might be 
approaching the highway from adjacent property, the 
motorist is less able to detect hazards emerging on the 
highway itself.52 
Deontologists differ about how conflicts of duties or rights should be 
resolved, but the simple fact that a conflict exists and that the duties 
and rights must be reconciled hardly commits one to a 
consequentialist form of accommodation.53 
 
 51. Stephen Perry, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Negligence Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
893, 896 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
 52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 cmt. e (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1 2005). 
 53. For a recent effort by a leading deontologists to explicate a nonconsequentialist method 
of accommodation, see FRANCES KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
PERMISSIBLE HARM 285–301 (2007). 
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Similarly, any plausible account must also engage in marginal 
analysis: it must consider whether moral or legal norms require a 
specific, discrete precaution (e.g., installing a safety guard on a piece 
of machinery), or whether they require a particular level of a 
continuous precaution (e.g., at what speed it is reasonably safe to 
drive, or how high to build a protective fence).  To be sure, marginal 
analysis is systematically employed, and heartily endorsed, by 
economic and utilitarian theorists.  This association might suggest 
that nonconsequentialists should therefore be very skeptical of 
marginal analysis.  But the conclusion does not follow.  Surely a 
deontologist will, and should, have more difficulty justifying a 
requirement that the owner of a cricket field place a dome over the 
field to prevent balls from escaping the field and injuring nearby 
pedestrians, than a requirement that he build a fence around the 
field.54 
In the remainder of this section, I review some “anti-balancing” 
arguments that have been offered by critics of consequentialism, 
arguments that I believe are too unqualified: that we should consider 
only the risks, benefits and burdens that the risky conduct creates to 
the actual injurer and the actual victim; that imposing any 
foreseeable risk is impermissible; or that any interpersonal 
aggregation of benefits or burdens is impermissible. 
1.  Do not restrict analysis of negligence to the risks, benefits and 
burdens that the risky conduct creates  
to the actual injurer and the actual victim 
One superficially plausible nonconsequentialist account of 
negligence, especially tempting to some corrective justice scholars, 
begins with the fact that the individual defendant has harmed an 
individual plaintiff, and then concludes that the question whether the 
defendant breached a duty to that plaintiff must be analyzed only in 
terms of the risks, benefits, and burdens to those two parties.55 
 
 54. See Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  Of course, 
the way in which deontologists conduct marginal analysis will differ from the way in which 
utilitarians conduct that analysis.  If, for example, the governing deontological principle is that 
substantial risks can only be imposed on those who sufficiently benefit from the risk, and if the 
benefit that pedestrians obtain from the presence of a neighborhood cricket field is relatively 
slight, then a deontologist might conclude that only a very high fence satisfies the duty of due 
care, while a lower (and less expensive) fence might satisfy a utilitarian. 
 55. See Perry, supra note 35, at 44–45; see also WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 142–44. 
  
Summer 2008] NEGLIGENCE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 1195 
This account is unrealistic and indefensible.  Limiting our 
evaluation of the permissibility of risky conduct to the risks posed to 
the person who was actually injured gives undue and unnecessary 
weight to luck, and fails to take seriously the ex ante perspective that 
we should adopt in assessing whether an actor has breached a duty of 
care. 
Focusing only on the ex ante risk to the person who was actually 
injured leads to highly implausible results.  Consider a simple 
example.  If I bring a group of people out on the lake on my boat, I 
have a duty not to overload the boat with too many passengers.  The 
fact that only Jane drowned because of my breach of that duty hardly 
shows that the scope of my duty, or the question whether I breached 
it, depends only on the risks of injury that my actions posed to Jane.  
My giving Jane alone a ride on the boat would have created no 
serious risk of injury or death from overloading.  I must consider the 
risks of harm (and the necessary precautions) in light of everyone I 
put at risk because of my failure to take a precaution. 
2.  Reject the broad, categorical principle  
that imposing any foreseeable risk is impermissible 
One prominent deontological account of negligence supports a 
truncated version of the Learned Hand test that, in essence, ignores 
“B,” the burden of taking a precaution.  Different versions of this 
account have been offered by Richard Wright,56 Ronen Perry,57 
Stephen Perry (in earlier writing),58 and Ernest Weinrib.59  I will limit 
my discussion here to the views of Wright and Ronen Perry. 
In Wright’s words: 
[G]iven the Kantian requirement of treating others as ends 
rather than merely as means, it is impermissible to use 
someone as a mere means to your ends by exposing him (or 
 
 56. Wright, supra note 35, at 256. 
 57. See e.g., Perry, supra note 35, at 42–43. 
 58. See Stephen Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 
147, 169–71 (1988).  Perry has since rejected this view.  Perry, supra note 51, at, 897. 
 59. See WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 148–52.  For discussion, see Kenneth Simons, 
Justifications in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. at 711–12 (1996). 
  David McCarthy, in a series of articles, has argued for a moral duty to compensate for 
imposing risks of harms on others, an argument recently defended in Tony Handfield & Trevor 
Pisciotta, Is the Risk-Liability Theory Compatible with Negligence Law?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 387 
(2005).  See David McCarthy, Liability and Risk, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 238, 259 (1996); David 
McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 ETHICS 205, 205–06 (1997). 
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his resources) to significant foreseeable unaccepted risks, 
regardless of how greatly the benefit to you might outweigh 
the risk to him.60 
Wright goes on to propose different standards of care for eight 
different situations, according to such factors as whether the injurer 
or victim benefits or whether the defendant is engaged in a socially 
essential activity.61  This is an imaginative rethinking of the tort 
negligence standard, and aspects of it are normatively appealing, as 
we will see.  Specifically, his emphasis on the critical importance of 
the distribution of risks and benefits is persuasive.  I do not believe, 
however, that his multiple standards accurately reflect tort doctrine, 
and the actual scheme that he recommends for implementing a 
concern with distribution is problematic. 
Consider, for example, Wright’s discussion of his first two 
categories.  The first category, “defendants’ treating others as 
means,” involves cases in which a defendant puts the plaintiff at risk 
to benefit the defendant or some third party, and the plaintiff does 
not seek to benefit directly from the risk-creating activity.  Here, he 
claims, the actual test of negligence is whether defendant created “a 
significant, foreseeable, and unaccepted risk to the person or 
property of others.”62  Only minimal legal authority, however, is 
offered for this descriptive claim. 
Wright’s second category, “defendants engaged in socially 
essential activities,” is exemplified by a fire engine speeding to the 
scene of a fire in a populated area.63  Here, one would think that it 
should be permissible to impose very substantial risks on others to 
secure the public benefit of saving lives immediately threatened by 
 
 60. Wright, supra note 35, at 256.  In more recent writing, Wright has modified his views in 
certain respects.  For example, he has clarified that he endorses a truncated BPL test (in which B 
is ignored) only when the defendant engages in risky conduct for private benefit.  Richard 
Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 
436–37 (2002).  He furthermore agrees that “socially valuable activities” such as emergency 
vehicles can justifiably impose risks on others, though he still insists that those risks must be less 
than “substantial,” an insistence I do not share.  Richard Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of 
the “Hand Formula,” 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 205 (2003). 
 61. His (non-exhaustive) categories are: (1) defendants’ treating others as means, (2) 
defendants engaged in socially essential activities, (3) defendant occupiers’ on-premises risks, (4) 
defendants’ activities involving participatory plaintiffs, (5) paternalistic defendants, (6) plaintiffs’ 
self-interested conduct, (7) plaintiffs’ self-sacrificing conduct, and (8) defendants’ failure to aid 
or rescue.  Wright, supra note 35, at 261–74. 
 62. Id. at 261. 
 63. Id. at 264. 
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fire.  But Wright claims that even emergency vehicles may not 
impose significant risks of injury on others.64  This is dubious.  Even 
when driven as carefully as the circumstances permit, consistent with 
very quickly reaching the scene of the fire, fire engines undoubtedly 
impose much greater risks than if they were driven more slowly.  
Police engaged in a high-speed chase of an armed, dangerous 
suspect, even when they use the extra care appropriate to the 
situation (which, alas, they often do not), undoubtedly impose 
significant risks on passersby.  I believe that it is unrealistic and 
unpersuasive to assert that in all of these cases, the defendants act 
impermissibly if they impose any “significant” risk on others.  As 
explained further below, the fact that the population as a whole 
shares the potential benefit of rescue from fire, or of security against 
the risk of harm from an escaping armed criminal, should permit 
rescue vehicles to impose relatively substantial risks to the public 
when these are necessary in order to achieve that benefit. 
But what about Wright’s first category, as he circumscribes it?  
Is “Do not impose any significant (and unaccepted) risk” a defensible 
criterion, at least in those cases where the injurer unilaterally 
imposes risks on a group of victims who do not benefit from the 
activity?  I will return to this question below. 
Let me turn to another version of Wright’s first criterion, 
defended in a forthcoming article by Professor Ronen Perry.  Perry 
advocates what he characterizes as a Kantian conception of 
negligence, under which an actor is liable for creating any “real,” 
foreseeable risk of injury.65  Two features of Perry’s argument are 
especially noteworthy.  First, he concludes that the burden of taking 
a precaution should be irrelevant to negligence liability.66  Second, he 
asserts that whether the actor has impermissibly created a “real” risk 
of injury to another is determined solely by examining “the 
interaction between the two parties to the action, and not on the 
effects of that interaction on society at large.”67 
 
 64. In emergencies, he says, the defendant can exceed normal speed limits and other traffic 
controls “only if she undertakes additional precautions or warnings (such as slowing down at 
intersections, sounding sirens, and flashing lights) so that those thereby put at risk can, without 
significant interference with their legitimate activities, avoid being exposed to a substantial or 
significant risk.”  Id. at 265. 
 65. Perry, supra note 35, at 39. 
 66. Id. at 51. 
 67. Id. at 45. 
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The first feature, by itself, would result in an extraordinarily 
broad liability rule, given that many common activities, such as 
driving an automobile, practicing medicine, or producing or using 
consumer products, create pervasive and nontrivial risks.68  Nor is it 
clear how one would distinguish risks below the threshold from risks 
above it, especially in light of the difficulty of identifying the proper 
frame of reference for assessing the degree of the risk.69 
The second feature does significantly limit the scope of the first, 
by insisting that we ignore the possible effects of a person’s conduct 
on persons other than the actual victim of the harm.  But this 
limitation is itself very difficult to justify.  As explained above, 
limiting our evaluation of the permissibility of risky conduct to the 
risks posed to the person who was actually injured gives undue and 
unnecessary weight to luck and insufficient consideration to the ex 
ante perspective that we should take in assessing whether an actor 
has breached a duty of care.  Moreover, one of Perry’s reasons for 
imposing the second limitation is misplaced.  Perry expresses 
concern that the duty of the actor should not depend on the effects of 
his interaction with the victim on society at large.  He is worried, in 
short, that a broader conception of the actor’s duty, extending beyond 
risks to the actual victim, will improperly turn on broad 
consequentialist considerations.  But on a plausible understanding of 
the extent of a tortfeasor’s duty of care, that duty extends to all who 
might foreseeably be harmed by failure to take a precaution.  This 
interpretation of the duty need not be consequentialist.  Rather, it 
simply reflects the ex ante perspective under which duty is defined.  
 
 68. See Robert Rabin, Law for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2274–76 (1996) (reviewing 
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)) (criticizing Weinrib’s similarly broad 
formulation of negligence); Simons, Justification, supra note 21, at 702–07 (criticizing Weinrib 
for the same reason). 
 69. According to Ronen Perry, one is negligent for posing real risks but not farfetched ones.  
“A farfetched risk is the kind of risk that every person is prepared to endure, knowing that all 
human activity involves such risks and that trying to eliminate them would disable action.  
Conversely, no one is willing to be exposed to real risks.”  Perry, supra note 35, at 39.  This is a 
valiant effort, but I fear that the distinction, so characterized, has little content.   
  For helpful discussion of these characterization problems, especially in the context of an 
objectivist view of risk, see Perry, supra note 23.  To be sure, the “threshold” problem potentially 
exists under the Learned Hand test as well, insofar as the test is sometimes interpreted as 
requiring the actor to incur a burden of precaution only if the risks are “foreseeable.”  The 
problem, however, is less troubling here, if the requirement can be understood more flexibly, 
taking into account both the degree of foreseeability and the nature and extent of the burden.  
Perhaps even very small risks should be avoided if the burden of avoidance is extremely small 
and even foreseeable or significant risks need not be avoided if the burden is quite significant. 
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To be sure, the class of persons foreseeably endangered by risky 
conduct cannot be precisely determined in advance,70 but it can be 
meaningfully described and delimited.  And, as we have seen, the 
valid conceptual point that a “risk of harm” presupposes some degree 
of probability (less than one) of a future consequence (the harm) 
does not imply that all normative theories of risk are consequentialist 
theories in the morally significant sense of that term. 
The rights-based claim that actors should be liable for all 
foreseeable risks might be understood differently, however, as a 
claim of strict liability, not negligence.  On this view, it is not 
necessarily wrongful or impermissible to engage in conduct, such as 
careful driving, that creates foreseeable risks of harm, but the driver 
should still pay for the harm caused by the (reasonable) risks he 
imposes on others.71  Whether nonconsequentialist principles can 
support this liability rule is beyond the scope of this essay.  But it is 
important to recognize that a very different normative justification is 
required to rationalize strict liability than to rationalize negligence 
liability for impermissible risk-imposition.72 
3.  Do not forbid all interpersonal aggregation of benefits or burdens 
The philosopher T.M. Scanlon has formulated a distinctive 
deontological principle, contractualism, which he believes is 
especially powerful in countering the attractions (and remedying the 
defects) of utilitarian accounts of interpersonal duties.  The 
introductory “World Cup” example is Keating’s variation on a 
famous example by Scanlon intended to show the moral deficiency 
of unrestricted utilitarian aggregation. 
Scanlon’s approach concentrates on the burdens that a moral 
principle would impose on all affected individuals, considered one 
 
 70. “Foreseeability” is itself an imprecise concept, but it can be given more determinate 
meaning in light of the principles of corrective justice, fairness, or consequentialist aggregation 
that justify its use.  See, e.g., Perry, supra note 23. 
 71. See Simons, Justification, supra note 21, at 705. 
 72. Negligence, in my view, connotes deficient behavior, while strict liability does not.  In 
principle, we would enjoin negligent conduct if we could.  Moreover, punitive damages would 
never be appropriate in strict liability cases.  Cf. Simons, Hand Formula, supra note 25, at 905–
06 (discussing the moral difference between strict liability and negligence); Kenneth W. Simons, 
Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: A Critique and Reformulation, 15 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 849 (1992). 
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by one.73  He plausibly asserts that his highly individual-focused 
approach explains the objection to a principle permitting unrestricted 
aggregation “in an intuitively appealing way.”74  But he avoids this 
(Scylla) principle at the apparent cost of colliding with an equally 
objectionable (Charybdis) principle prohibiting any aggregation 
whatsoever.  Thus, he has great difficulty explaining why a rescuer, 
faced with the choice of rescuing either five people from Island A 
who would otherwise die or one person from Island B, may 
permissibly save the five (rather than flip a coin or use some other 
method of choice).75  Scanlon would have even greater difficulty 
explaining why it is permissible for a rescuer to save a group of 
people, each of whom will otherwise suffer the same type and degree 
of harm, rather than a single person, who will otherwise suffer a 
slightly greater harm than each of the group.  Suppose, for example, 
that the five people on A will each suffer the loss of a limb if not 
rescued, while the one person on B will otherwise suffer both the 
loss of a limb and a mild headache.76  These difficulties are 
 
 73. SCANLON, supra note 5, at 229–31 (discussing the “Complaint Model”).  Scanlon 
explains that “a central feature of contractualism [is] its insistence that the justifiability of a moral 
principle depends only on various individuals’ reasons for objecting to that principle and 
alternatives to it.”  Id. at 229.  See generally Elizabeth Ashford & Tim Mulgan, Contractualism, 
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 6, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/contractualism/.  For a valuable overview of the 
contractualist method, including the requirement that the governing moral principle be one that no 
affected individual could “reasonably reject,” see Rahul Kumar, Reasonable Reasons in 
Contractualist Moral Argument, 114 ETHICS 6 (2003). 
 74. SCANLON, supra note 5, at 230: 
A contractualist theory, in which all objections to a principle must be raised by 
individuals, blocks such [aggregative] principles in an intuitively appealing way.  It 
allows the intuitively compelling complaints of those who are severely burdened to be 
heard, while, on the other side, the sum of the smaller benefits to others has no 
justificatory weight, since there is no individual who enjoys these benefits and would 
have to forgo them if the policy were disallowed. 
 75. In essence, Scanlon employs the following “pair-wise comparison” or tie-breaker 
argument: the claim to rescue of the one on B offsets the equal claim of one person on A.  Once 
these claims are put aside, the only remaining claims are those of the remaining four on A, and 
there is no good reason not to rescue them.  This argument has been criticized, however, as 
permitting a limited form of aggregation after all.  See, e.g., Michael Otsuka, Scanlon and the 
Claims of the Many Versus the One, 60 ANALYSIS 288 (2000).  Frances Kamm offers an 
argument similar to the “tie-breaker” argument for why the numbers can count.  KAMM, supra 
note 53, at 56–61, 479–81. 
 76. See Ashford & Mulgan, supra note 73, § 6.  The following example is suggested by 
Derek Parfit’s discussion of contractualism and aggregation: 
Consider a choice between two scenarios.  In the first, one person suffers agony for a 
hundred years; while in the second a million people suffer agony for a hundred years 
minus a day.  An additional day of agony is a considerable burden.  Therefore if we 
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problematic enough for harms and benefits that are certain to occur; 
they are especially troublesome in the context of risks of harm.  For 
our activities typically create multiple sets of risks and benefits to 
different classes of people, and if we can never aggregate across 
people, it seems that we can never justify such risky conduct. 
Addressing the issue of the permissible allocation of risk, though 
only briefly, Scanlon notes one appealing feature of his approach: it 
does not permit the low probability that one will be exposed to an 
otherwise unjustifiable risk to be determinative in situations where 
this is intuitively objectionable.77  But he also concedes that his 
contractualist approach, by condemning all aggregation, appears to 
have highly counterintuitive implications, including the implication 
that high-speed driving, construction projects, and other activities 
that predictably will lead to serious injuries and deaths are 
unacceptable if their justification depends on much smaller benefits 
to a larger number of people.78  The numbers do sometimes count 
 
consider the situation from the perspective of the single individuals involved, it would 
seem that the first person’s complaint (‘I will suffer for a hundred years’) outweighs 
the complaint of any other single individual (‘I will suffer for a hundred years minus a 
day’).  However, a utilitarian would argue that, in this case, the second scenario is 
worse. 
Derek Parfit, Justifiability to Each Person, 16 RATIO 368–70 (2003). 
 77. See SCANLON, supra note 5, at 208–09: 
Consider [a] principle licensing us to impose very severe hardships on a tiny minority 
of people, chosen at random (by making them involuntary subjects of painful and 
dangerous medical experiments, for example), in order to benefit a much larger 
majority.  A contractualist would want to keep open the possibility that such a principle 
could reasonably be rejected because of the severe burdens it involves.  But this would 
be effectively ruled out [if one endorses an alternative proposal, that improbability of 
harm is relevant to justifiability], according to which the weight given to these burdens 
. . . would be sharply discounted because only a very small fraction of the population 
would actually suffer them. 
 78. See id. at 238; T.M. Scanlon, Replies, 28 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 337, 355 (2002); see 
also Elizabeth Ashford, The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism, 113 ETHICS 273, 298–
301 (2003) (arguing that Scanlon’s nonaggregation requirement would have dramatic 
implications, such as forbidding air travel).  Scanlon concedes that he views the part of his book, 
THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE EACH OTHER (1998), devoted to the question of aggregation 
the “least satisfactory.”  Scanlon, supra, at 354. 
  Gregory Keating, a tort scholar otherwise sympathetic to Scanlon’s critique of 
aggregation, believes that sometimes, trading risks to life for convenience is permissible.  
Keating, supra note 2, at 702; Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essay for Guido 
Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 159, 195–201 (2005).  Implicitly, he rejects Scanlon’s pair-wise 
comparison approach as inadequate. 
  
1202 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1171 
morally.79  The great difficulty, on a contractualist account, is to 
explain when they do, and why. 
Nevertheless, there is some hope, as we will see, that a limited 
type of aggregation might be consistent with at least important 
aspects of the contractualist project. 
IV.  ENDORSEMENT OF QUALIFIED VIEWS 
More qualified consequentialist and deontological views offer 
more plausible accounts of important aspects of negligence doctrine 
and of our considered intuitions about permissible risks. 
A.  Qualified (“Sensitive”) Consequentialism 
We have already seen that any plausible version of utilitarianism 
must launder and idealize preferences to some extent, and thus will 
sometimes reject subjective valuations of benefits if they are 
inconsistent with a defensible conception of social utility.  (Recall 
the example of the driver who obtains pleasure from racing a train.)  
And once utilitarianism is qualified in this way, it has a number of 
possible variants.  For example, utility itself could be understood not 
as preference-satisfaction, but as constituted by certain limited 
categories of objective social goods such as Amartya Sen’s 
“capabilities,” or the objective lists of goods offered by Martha 
Nussbaum or James Griffin (including such varied goods as life, 
bodily health, accomplishment, autonomy, enjoyment, and deep 
personal relations).80 
Let us turn, then, to forms of qualified consequentialism that 
offer some hope of addressing the concerns raised by the initial 
examples. 
 
 79. John Taurek’s famous article has spawned a large body of nonconsequentialist literature 
trying to justify the consideration of relative numbers in choice situations.  John Taurek, Should 
the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 316 (1997).  For a recent review of some of the 
relevant literature, see Iwao Hirose, Review Article: Aggregation and Non-Utilitarian Moral 
Theories, 4 J. MORAL PHIL. 273 (2007). 
 80. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 45, at 31–32.  For a useful survey of some of these 
possibilities, see id. at 28–35.  Adler and Posner reject a purely objective view and endorse a 
“restricted preference-based view” of welfare, in which subjective preference is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for a state of affairs to enhance the subject’s welfare.  Id. at 36. 
  The approaches of tort scholars Mark Geistfeld and Gregory Keating seem to be based at 
least in part on an “objective good” conception of well-being.  See generally Mark Geistfeld, 
Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L. J. 585 (2003) (claiming 
that tort law prioritizes the security interest of victims over the liberty and economic interests of 
injurers); Keating, supra note 48 (asserting a similar claim). 
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1.  Consider the distribution of risk in the social welfare  
calculus of what is permissible 
The most obvious way for a consequentialist to respond to the 
objection that one may not permissibly impose enormous risks of 
harm on a few to benefit a different group is to build this concern 
about unjust distribution into the social welfare calculus.  Of course, 
a distribution-sensitive social welfare function is hardly a new idea.81  
However, the distributive problem we confront here is rather 
different from the usual concern that the ex post distribution of 
wealth and income that flows from a utilitarian social and economic 
system might lead to or accentuate the maldistribution of basic 
resources (or, in the Rawlsian phrase, of “primary goods”82).  The 
usual prescription to use tax and transfer policies to correct the 
maldistribution after the fact will hardly do when we are addressing 
individual decisions whether to engage in a risky activity.  Moreover, 
it is important to remember that the question we are addressing is 
what risks it is permissible to create, and not merely what to do about 
allocating the costs of risky activities that cause harm.  In the World 
Cup example, the television studio certainly should compensate for 
the harm if it chooses to continue the broadcast.  But it would have 
been much better if it had chosen otherwise; and indeed, the case is 
one in which punitive damages seem perfectly appropriate. 
So the question remains: in determining when it is permissible 
for an actor to impose a risk of harm on others, is it feasible to 
develop a consequentialist calculus that also considers the 
distribution of risk and benefits (perhaps as a side-constraint on the 
basic maximizing, aggregative analysis)? 
This does seem theoretically feasible.  For example, the legal 
standard could endorse utilitarian maximization subject to the 
constraint that most or all members of the class subject to the risk 
must also obtain some benefit, or sufficient benefit, from the risky 
activity.  It is no easy matter, however, to explain what type and 
degree of reciprocity or fairness in distributing benefits and burdens 
is required here (as we will see in the more extensive discussion 
 
 81. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28-38 
(2002) (explaining how the framework of welfare economics can encompass concerns about the 
distribution of income). 
 82. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 57–61 (2001). 
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below).  Needless to say, this criterion cannot readily be expressed 
by any simple formula, such as the Learned Hand test. 
Moreover, even this distribution-sensitive approach does not 
fully address the concern in Keating and Scanlon’s examples that 
trivial benefits could, if aggregated across enough people, outweigh 
very substantial harms or risks of harm, and thus could, on a 
consequentialist account, justify imposing that risk.  Even when the 
distribution of benefits and burdens does not seem unfair, this 
concern remains.  Consider this variation of World Cup: 
WORLD CUP BROADCAST WITH RANDOM (VIEWER) VICTIM 
Suppose that a piece of transmitting equipment has 
malfunctioned and, unless fixed, will interrupt for thirty 
minutes the live broadcast of the World Cup to a billion 
viewers worldwide.  Unfortunately, the only way to fix the 
equipment immediately is to send a corrective electronic 
signal that (we can confidently predict) will also randomly 
cause one of the television sets tuned in to the broadcast to 
explode, likely killing one viewer. 
 
Here, every potential victim is also a beneficiary of the 
broadcast, but it hardly seems permissible to sacrifice one life in 
order to provide a billion people with a small benefit.  It is not clear 
that a consequentialist can solve this problem.83 
2.  Consider the distribution of risk in determining  
whether to compensate 
This essay focuses on how negligence should be analyzed.  
However, it is worth considering the argument that an unjust or 
impermissible distribution of risk should not matter at all to whether 
conduct is negligent, but instead should only be relevant to the 
question whether the injurer should pay for the harm.  This argument 
is a specific version of an argument often asserted by advocates of 
law and economics, that utilitarianism or efficiency should be the 
normative basis of legal rules, and that the legal system should 
address any problems of inequity or unjust distribution through the 
 
 83. However, she could endorse a mixed theory that includes a deontological constraint—for 
example, the constraint that benefits below some threshold of significance will be excluded from 
the social welfare function.  See text at infra note 102. 
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tax and transfer system.  Why is this strict liability principle not an 
adequate response to unfair distribution of the risk of harm? 
One answer is that compensation for some types of harms is 
impossible.  No amount of money will fully compensate a dead 
person.  In Keating’s World Cup example, the death of the technician 
cannot be undone.  No amount of compensation from the television 
studio, or from the billion people who enjoy the live broadcast, will 
suffice.84 
But full compensation for other types of harms seems to be 
feasible.  This is especially obvious for harms to property and 
economic interests.  Some amount of compensation will almost 
always be sufficient to make the victim indifferent, after the fact, 
between receiving the compensation for the harm or not having 
suffered the harm at all. 
Or consider Scanlon’s original hypothetical, which differs 
significantly from Keating’s version.  In the original, if the 
technician is not rescued, he will suffer no permanent injury, but 
merely an hour of extremely painful shocks: 
SCANLON’S ORIGINAL WORLD CUP BROADCAST CASE: 
Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the 
transmitter room of a television station.  Electrical 
equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him 
without turning off the transmitter for fifteen minutes.  A 
World Cup match is in progress, watched by many people, 
and it will not be over for an hour.  Jones’s injury will not 
 
 84. Indeed, Mark Geistfeld has argued that precisely because full compensation is infeasible 
for serious physical injuries and death, an unusually demanding negligence standard (rather than a 
cost-benefit negligence standard or a strict liability standard) is necessary in such cases in order to 
provide adequate deterrence and to provide potential victims with a justifiable substitute for full 
compensation.  The more demanding negligence standard is a legitimate substitute, he argues, 
because it provides such victims ex ante benefits: they are exposed to less risk than a cost-benefit 
negligence test would permit.  See Geistfeld, supra note 80, at 602–08.  This argument is 
intriguing, but the cure does not seem to match the diagnosis.  After all, strict liability rules apply 
even when serious personal injury or death occurs.  Insofar as compensation is inadequate to 
achieve optimal deterrence, we could address the problem more consistently and directly, for 
example by adding an extracompensatory award to damages (in serious physical injury cases), a 
part of which the state receives.  Finally, the ex ante benefits that potential victims obtain from 
the requirement that the injurer use extraordinary care will help only a small number of victims 
(those who would have been injured if the injurer had used ordinary care but are not injured when 
he uses extraordinary care), and these benefits are conferred more or less randomly.  It is not clear 
why saving this small and arbitrarily defined group from harm is an apt response to the problem 
of undercompensation. 
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get any worse if we wait, but his hand has been mashed and 
he is receiving extremely painful shocks.  Should we rescue 
him now or wait until the match is over?  Does the right 
thing to do depend on how many people are watching—
whether it is one million or five million or a hundred 
million?85 
 
Suppose Jones would be indifferent after the fact between some 
generous form of compensation and not having suffered this injury.  
Is everyone not better off if we permit the injury to occur? 
This argument seems to prove too much.  For it would also seem 
to permit risky activities that we would normally consider 
impermissible even apart from distributive considerations.  
Negligence would, then, always be acceptable behavior so long as 
the negligent actor was willing to pay the full price. 
Scanlon and other moral philosophers who have emphasized the 
problematic nature of aggregative principles such as utilitarianism 
have focused almost exclusively on permissibility—on whether an 
actor may permissibly impose (or choose not to prevent) serious risks 
of harm on a small number of persons simply because a very large 
number of persons will obtain small benefits.  And a primary moral 
duty not to impose such risks would ordinarily justify a secondary 
moral (and, arguably, legal) duty to compensate if the risk results in 
harm.  But does the imposition of the risk actually become 
permissible if full compensation, where feasible, is awarded? 
I do not think so.  Some kinds of risk-imposition are wrongful, 
whether or not the victim can be fully compensated.  Suppose a 
wealthy thrill-seeker happily pays for the property damage that his 
dangerous driving causes, and suppose his compensation payments 
leave his victims indifferent between (a) suffering harm and being 
compensated or (b) not suffering harm.  He is still a wrongdoer, and 
still should not cause the harm.  This is so even if somehow he could 
be certain in advance that the only harms he will cause are ones that 
can be fully compensated.  The problem is not simply the practical 
concern about future incentives—that a policy of allowing such a 
person to treat tort liability as a price of permissible activity rather 
than as a sanction for impermissible activity will often encourage 
 
 85. SCANLON, supra note 5, at 235. 
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him or others to engage in wrongdoing that leaves many victims 
undercompensated.86  Rather, the problem is deeper: in principle, an 
actor should not treat victims in this way, even if they would, ex 
post, be satisfied with compensation.  We would certainly not be 
comfortable granting someone a license to steal, to assault, or to 
humiliate another, even if he was willing to pay the costs, and even if 
all the immediate victims would be satisfied ex post that they had 
been fully compensated. 
To be sure, impermissible risky activity does not rise to that 
level of wrongdoing.  But sometimes it is still sufficiently wrongful 
that ex post compensation does not vitiate the wrong.  To put this 
argument in utilitarian terms, all citizens suffer noncompensable 
harm or disutility from living in a system in which the right to 
engage in impermissible conduct can be bought for a price.  From a 
deontological perspective, potential victims have a status of 
inviolability that such a practice would undermine.87 
Where does this leave the argument that an act that unjustly 
distributes risks and benefits can always be addressed by 
compensation, rather than by treating the underlying conduct as 
negligent and impermissible?  Sometimes, at least, distributive 
injustice makes an otherwise permissible act negligent.88  This seems 
to be the case in both World Cup examples. 
On the other hand, perhaps when the only harms at stake are 
harms to property and economic interests, a distributive inequality of 
the sort illustrated in the World Cup examples would not be 
objectionable.  Suppose, for example, that the World Cup scenario is 
modified in this way: the television equipment will cause $1 million 
in damage to an adjoining property unless it is shut off, but again, if 
it is shut off, a billion people would lose the pleasure of watching the 
 
 86. Often, there is no guarantee that a risky activity will create no substantial risk of serious 
injury or death, which are the types of injures for which full compensation is most obviously 
impossible.  And even if the activity risks causing only emotional harm or harm to property 
interests, these, too, cannot always feasibly be fully compensated.  Even here, the legal system 
cannot compensate effectively either for all consequential economic harms or for emotional 
harms that are difficult to measure reliably, due to problems of subjective valuation and fraud. 
 87. See KAMM, supra note 53, at 26–30, 253–56. 
 88. Other forms of distributive fairness might aptly be secured by strict liability rather than 
negligence liability.  Consider the vicarious liability of retailers for product defects that are 
initially created by manufacturers.  This type of strict liability arguably serves a loss-spreading 
function in order to achieve a localized form of distributive justice: it is more fair that the 
blameless retailer rather than the consumer absorb the risk of the manufacturer’s insolvency. 
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World Cup live.  Is it not permissible to continue the broadcast, so 
long as the property damage is fully compensated? 
B.  Qualified (“Tough-minded”) Deontology 
In this section, I explore three broad categories of qualified 
deontological principles that, by comparison to more unqualified 
principles, more readily permit tradeoffs and limited forms of 
aggregation.  The first category focuses on the individual put at risk 
and asks whether he sufficiently benefits from the risky activity.  It 
permits aggregation of risks and benefits, but only intrapersonally.  
The second category is threshold deontology: it permits 
consequences to count, but only in a constrained or limited way.  
Each category has considerable promise in addressing the problems 
and conundrums noted at the outset.  A third distinction, between 
individual and population risk, initially appears promising, but its 
practical significance for negligence law is uncertain. 
1.  Permit intrapersonal but not interpersonal  
aggregation of risks and benefits 
Nonconsequentialists, including even contractualists, might be 
able to support intrapersonal aggregation of risks and benefits, 
without sliding all the way down that slippery slope to unrestricted 
interpersonal aggregation.89  When those who benefit are entirely 
coextensive with those put at risk, many nonconsequentialists would 
have no objection to permitting the risky activity (so long as the 
benefit is sufficiently valuable to justify the risk).  Straightforward 
examples include individual decisions to undergo surgery, or to take 
a drug with known possible side-effects, despite the risks.90  Another 
 
 89. This method is endorsed by some contractualists in recent writings.  See, e.g., SCANLON, 
supra note 5, at 237; .Oberdiek, supra note 5; John Oberdiek, The Morality of Risking: On The 
Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania) (on file with author). 
 90. Or consider an example offered by Benjamin Zipursky: 
In some scenarios . . . it would arguably comply with a norm of being reasonably 
careful to adopt a single metric and to adopt an aggregative analysis.  For example, in 
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp., then-Judge Breyer used 
an economic version of the Hand Formula in a banking case.  The question was 
whether a bank used ordinary care to ascertain customers’ check forgeries.  The bank 
argued that its policy of random checking was reasonable, and it showed that the policy 
was far cheaper and only marginally less effective than—or perhaps as effective as—a 
system that looked at every check.  Affirming a District Court judge, and using the 
Hand Formula and cost-benefit analysis, Judge Breyer agreed with the bank.  The 
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example is “Sub-subcompact automobile,” from the introduction.  A 
manufacturer may permissibly sell a product that poses unavoidable 
risks of harm to consumers or users if they obtain significant benefits 
from the product.  This approach retains contractualism’s focus on 
the individual, and characterizes a risk as permissible only if each 
individual exposed to a risk of harm can be said to benefit 
sufficiently from the conduct or activity that creates the risk. 
The intrapersonal aggregation approach also helps to make sense 
of the introductory Bus Driver example.  Louise, it seems, should not 
take more or less care in driving her bus simply because she is 
carrying more or fewer passengers.  But one possible explanation is 
that each of the passengers (however many there are) benefits 
equally from her driving a little more quickly: each arrives at his 
destination a bit sooner.  So if the traffic and other conditions permit 
her to drive slightly more quickly, this provides roughly proportional 
benefits to one, ten, or forty passengers.  In terms of the BPL 
formula, a slightly higher speed imposes a slightly greater risk of 
harm on each passenger, but also is likely to provide a slight benefit 
to each passenger; the loss of that benefit is a marginal “burden” (B) 
that might exceed the marginal increase in risk to their safety (P x L). 
Compare a different bus driver case: 
MARLA, DRIVING A BUS NEAR MANY OR FEW  
PEDESTRIANS (PARADE ROUTE) 
Marla is driving a bus.  A parade has just ended and there 
are thick crowds by the side of the road.  Should she drive 
more slowly in this scenario, than if the parade ended an 
hour ago and there are only a few people still lingering? 
 
financial burden of examining each check’s signature was not warranted by the 
reduction of risk of forgeries, under the Hand Formula.  But note that the choice of an 
economic metric here was appropriate because of the nature of the interests at stake.  
And the aggregative method was appropriate because the bank customers—like the 
plaintiff in the case—would bear much of the increased cost of forgery-detection.  
There was thus little tension between the interests of the defendant and of the plaintiff. 
Benjamin Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2025–26 (2007) (citations 
omitted).  For an analogous example, see Keating, supra note 2, at 712 (noting that the benefits 
and burdens of the Pasteur vaccine are borne by the same class of people). 
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Clearly she should drive more slowly when more people are at risk.  
If she were to lose control of the bus just after the parade ended, the 
bus would harm or kill many, rather than few.91 
What explains the difference between this bus case and the 
earlier one involving Louise and a variable number of bus 
passengers?  Why do numbers count for Marla, but not for Louise?  
In both cases, after all, driving more slowly would decrease risks of 
harm; and in both cases, driving more slowly when more people are 
at risk (when the bus is more full, or the sidewalk is more crowded) 
will reduce aggregate risk more.  But by the same token, in both 
cases each individual can plausibly claim that he is entitled to 
adequate protection against risks of harm without regard to how 
many other individuals are also at risk. 
Perhaps the explanation is this.  The pedestrians in “Parade 
route” (unlike the riders on Louise’s bus) clearly obtain no 
compensating benefit from any decision by Marla to increase her 
speed, and lose no benefit if she decreases her speed.  So if she slows 
down when the aggregate risk of harm is greater, they clearly are 
better off. 
Notice, though, that at any given speed, the individual risk that 
the bus poses to each pedestrian could be precisely the same in both 
scenarios (crowded sidewalk v. almost empty sidewalk), yet we 
would still want her to slow down when the sidewalk is more 
crowded.  (Suppose there is a 1 in 1,000 risk of injury to each 
pedestrian in each scenario if she is driving at thirty mph, a 1 in 
2,000 risk if she is driving at twenty-five mph, and so on.)  Thus, the 
Louise example does not demonstrate that the individual risk to each 
victim is always a determinative factor.  Aggregate risk sometimes is 
morally relevant even when individual risk does not vary (as it does 
not in the Marla examples).92 
Nevertheless, the intrapersonal aggregation approach is no 
panacea.  Trouble comes in the very common situation when the 
class benefited and the class endangered are not perfectly 
coextensive.  Very often, an actor’s risky conduct endangers many 
people, and very often, these potential victims differ significantly in 
 
 91. Assume that the distance from the bus to the pedestrians, and all other variables affecting 
the risk (such as the ability of the pedestrians to protect themselves), are precisely the same in 
both cases.  Thus, the only relevant difference is the number of endangered victims. 
 92. For more discussion of individual v. population risk, see infra text at notes 112–116.  
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how much they benefit from the activity.  (Even in the Louise 
example, some passengers will benefit more than others from more 
speedily reaching their destination, and some might not benefit at 
all.)  How much slippage, if any, is too much? 
Recall the earlier example of speeding emergency vehicles 
(police, ambulances, or fire engines) that endanger motorists and 
pedestrians for a public purpose.  Here, because everyone potentially 
benefits from the availability of life-saving ambulances and fire 
engines, or police vehicles that protect public security, it seems 
plausible to conclude that those put at risk also obtain ex ante 
benefits that suffice to justify the risk.  (The vehicles should, of 
course, proceed as safely as is realistically possible, consistent with 
their need for speed.) 
And yet, on closer inspection, this argument of potential benefit 
is inconclusive.  Relatively few people will actually need to be 
rescued or protected by emergency vehicles.  So we are really 
comparing possible benefits with possible risks; and of course the 
distribution of actual benefit and actual harm will (ex post) not be to 
the net benefit of every person (especially those killed or seriously 
injured by the speeding emergency vehicles). 
Still, it might be enough that people value the chance of a 
benefit sufficiently highly that it outweighs the risk of harm.  
Obviously it can be justifiable to market a drug that will definitely 
benefit me, but has a small chance of causing serious side-effects, 
which (if they were to occur) would outweigh that benefit.  But it 
also seems quite justifiable to market a drug that will offer users only 
a possible benefit, if that benefit is sufficiently great to justify the 
risks.93 
If all this is true, however, then the “potential benefit” argument 
seems to have a much broader and more worrisome implication.  
Think about the “unilateral risk-imposition” cases that deontologists 
find especially troubling—“unilateral” in the sense that one party 
obtains all or almost all of the benefit from the interaction.  The 
argument implies that such risks may very often be imposed—
specifically, whenever people have a sufficient ex ante chance to 
 
 93. Notice that in Zipursky’s bank example, although the correlation of risk and benefit 
intuitively seems sufficient to make the bank’s level of precaution permissible, some bank 
customers will actually be worse off under the bank’s system than they would have been if the 
bank had taken the suggested precaution. 
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benefit either from that unilateral risk-imposition or from some other 
unilateral risk-imposition.  Let me explain. 
Consider some relatively clear cases of unilateral risk 
imposition: drivers create risks to pedestrians; product manufacturers 
create risks to non-users of their products (for example, a bystander 
is injured when a product explodes, crashes, or otherwise causes 
harm);94 the activity of a sports team or facility results in balls being 
hit out of the field or park into the surrounding community.95  In 
these cases, where the potential victims do not benefit from the risky 
activity, many nonconsequentialists would object that a simple 
benefit/risk or cost/benefit analysis is inadequate to justify the risk, 
insofar as one party benefits at the other party’s expense.  They 
would insist, for example, that in building a fence to protect people 
outside the park from harm, greater care is required than in building 
a fence to protect spectators inside the park who benefit from the 
activity.96 
Yet it is possible to invoke the “potential benefit” argument even 
here. Life is full of risky activities that benefit one party to the 
interaction a little more (sometimes a lot more) than they benefit the 
other.  However, we all engage in multiple activities.  Sometimes we 
will be more at risk, sometimes less so.  Sometimes we benefit more, 
sometimes less.  Sometimes we will be the unilateral imposers, 
sometimes the imposees.  It all comes out in the wash. 
This argument, if persuasive, appears to justify a straightforward 
utilitarian analysis of negligence, even in unilateral risk cases.  The 
 
 94. In each case, the risk imposition is not entirely unilateral: pedestrians make decisions 
about how closely to approach traffic, and bystanders injured by products might similarly make 
decisions that affect their probability of injury.  But the driver or product manufacturer (and 
product user) obtain almost all of the benefit from the risky interaction, so it is appropriate to 
characterize the benefits derived in the cases as substantially unilateral. 
 95. The classic illustration here is the English cricket case, Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), in which a cricket ball was hit over the fence and struck 
the plaintiff.  Litigation over stray golf balls is also plentiful.  See, e.g., Rinaldo v. McGovern, 
587 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1991) (in which a sliced golf ball “soared” off the course and shattered 
plaintiff’s windshield as she was driving by). 
 96. “Greater care” here could mean placing a thumb on the cost-benefit or BPL scale.  See 
infra text at notes 104-105. The important point is that, everything else being equal, 
nonbeneficiaries of the activity are entitled to greater protection from risks of harm than are 
beneficiaries.  Everything else will often not be equal, of course.  Most obviously, if the potential 
victim is a spectator, he will likely have a much greater ability to protect himself from harm than 
if he is a pedestrian strolling outside the park.  Imagine, however, that the potential victim is a 
five year old child, with little ability to protect himself in either case; here, greater care might still 
be owed to the child walking outside the stadium than to the child sitting in the stands. 
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constraint that intrapersonal aggregation was supposed to place upon 
interpersonal aggregation has evaporated.  Where did we go wrong? 
We went awry in permitting much too broad a conception of 
“potential benefit” in this last argument.  That wide conception 
essentially says: “You live in a society in which utilitarian 
risk/benefit analysis governs all interactions. By permitting risk 
imposition whenever the expected total benefits from the risk exceed 
the expected total costs, we offer you the greatest ex ante chance of 
utility, greater than the expected utility that any other criterion of 
negligence would create.”  This broad understanding of “potential 
benefit” goes too far: it potentially justifies very significant 
distributional variations in many specific interactions.  Even the 
World Cup examples might, on this view, be cases where the victims 
obtained a “potential benefit” and thus might be cases of permissible 
risk-imposition. 
So “potential benefit” must be understood more restrictively.  
Just how we should draw the line between permissible and 
impermissible inequalities in benefit and risk distribution, however, 
is a daunting question.  Is it a serious injustice that some bystanders 
who do not benefit from using a particular type of consumer product 
suffer injury from it?  Presumably they use other consumer products; 
is that similar enough to count as benefiting from “the activity”?  
Neighbors of golf courses (who, let us assume, purchased their land 
before the golf course was built) benefit if the presence of the golf 
course increases the value of their homes.  These complexities exist 
in virtually every context. 
Others who have explored these questions endorse some degree 
of generalization of the nature of the risky activity, for the purpose of 
determining who benefits from “that type” of risky activity, or of 
determining how burdensome it would be to forbid “that type” of 
risk.97  I offer no solution here,98 but simply point out the need to 
define any category of “unilateral benefit from risk-imposition” with 
care, and, perhaps, narrowly. 
 
 97. See Keating, supra note 2, at 704–718; see also Oberdiek, supra note 5, at 202–03; 
Oberdiek, supra note 89, at 117–24; Perry, supra note 40, at 110–15; SCANLON, supra note 5, at 
239–41 (discussing the possibility that aggregation is permitted for “relevant” but not “irrelevant” 
risks while acknowledging the difficulty of drawing the distinction). 
 98. “Explaining the role and limits of aggregation is a difficult problem for moral theory 
generally, not just for contractualism.”  Scanlon, supra note 78, at 354. 
  
1214 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1171 
2.  Apply threshold deontology to risky activity 
One way to make deontology more “hard-nosed” and more 
accommodating of tradeoffs is to permit consequences to count, or 
even to dominate, after (but only after) the consequences have 
surpassed some threshold of seriousness.  Even the relatively 
absolutist libertarian approach of Robert Nozick, for example, has a 
“catastrophe” exception.99  Other threshold deontologists place the 
threshold much lower.  In the context of judging when it is 
impermissible to create a risk of harm, the threshold must be much 
lower than “catastrophe” if this approach is meant to justify our 
actual social practice of accepting a broad range of risky activities. 
Some believe that threshold deontology is incoherent.100  Others 
find this form of moderate deontology perfectly defensible.101  Rather 
than engage this difficult, more general debate, I will try to identify 
versions of threshold deontology in the context of negligence that are 
intuitively attractive. 
These versions are not as simple as usual threshold deontology 
principles of the form, “Don’t violate a right or duty (e.g., don’t 
suppress speech, don’t torture, don’t punish or kill an innocent 
person) unless the consequences of respecting the right or duty are 
unusually bad.”  Rather, some of them might be interpreted instead 
as instances of “threshold consequentialism”—an acceptance of 
consequentialism but only up to a point or subject to certain limits.  
For many of them require significant variations on a straightforward 
consequentialist calculus of the basic form, “take a precaution if B < 
P x L.” 
In very general terms, at least three techniques are available to a 
deontologist who wishes to consider consequences without fully 
 
 99. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29-30 n. * (1974); see also JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 356 (1993) (stating that the state may restrict a basic liberty such 
as speech, but only in order to prevent a greater loss to basic liberties). 
 100. See, e.g.,  Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. R. 893, 856, 
905–10 (2000); Alexander & Moore, supra note 42, § 4; see also Matthew D. Adler, Why De 
Minimis? (June 8, 2007) (unpublished research paper No. 0712, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=992878). 
 101. See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 78–84 (1998) (arguing that moderate 
deontology is “a genuine alternative to consequentialism”); cf. KAMM, supra note 53, at 285–301 
(although not admitting to be a threshold deontologist, Kamm permits aggregation and gives 
weight to the relative numbers of victims and the relative size of burdens; indeed, she does so 
surprisingly often, for a deontologist). 
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endorsing a consequentialist analysis of permissible risk.  However, 
a fuller exploration of these methods must await another day. 
First, the deontologist can ignore trivial benefits.102  This is one 
possible explanation of the World Cup examples: the aggregate 
benefits to even a billion people are morally and legally irrelevant if 
the benefit to each person is tiny.  This approach also helps explain 
why highly refined marginal analysis sometimes seems 
objectionable.103 
Second, she can place a thumb on the usual scale, either in all 
cases or in a subcategory of cases, such as clear instances of 
unilateral risk imposition.  This is the “disproportionate risk” 
approach that, some believe, the English courts followed until 
recently.104  Instead of finding D negligent if B < P x L, a “thumb” is 
added to the scale as follows: 
D is negligent if and only if  B < n x ( P x L) , where n > 1.105 
 
 102. See KAMM, supra note 53, at 34 (discussing the Principle of Irrelevant Goods).  Consider 
Kamm’s “Sore Throat” case.  If we are choosing between preventing a serious harm to A or an 
equally serious harm to B, she says that we should flip a coin.  What if B also has a Sore Throat?  
That is insufficient reason in this context, she says, to save B; we should still flip a coin.  Id.; see 
also T.M. Scanlon, Replies, 17 RATIO 424, 433 (2003) (tentatively endorsing Parfit’s suggested 
Triviality Principle). 
 103. Recall the earlier image of a corporate accountant methodically inputting the various 
probabilities of harm and benefit into a spreadsheet; if the costs are $1,000,001 and the benefits 
are $1,000,000, then under a marginal cost-benefit analysis, he should instruct the engineers or 
product designers not to add the safety feature.  But under Kamm’s “Irrelevant Utilities” 
argument, presumably it would be better if he flipped a coin. 
  On the other hand, the situation of evaluating permissible levels of risk is a highly 
repetitive one, and will often result in relatively close calls, given how often we need to make 
decisions about the level of precaution.  So perhaps it is more defensible to reject Kamm’s 
approach here and adopt a consistent strategy of choosing the less costly option, at least if the 
costs have been properly valued in the first place.  In the original “Sore Throat” case, by contrast, 
the situation appears to be extraordinary and highly unlikely to repeat. 
 104. Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence 
Law, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 489, 497 (2002).  Mark Geistfeld has endorsed a version of this 
approach.  See Geistfeld, supra note 80, at 610; Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with 
the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 166 (2001); see also 
Keating, supra note 78, at 160 (endorsing, in special situations, statutory standards that require 
risk reduction (1) to greatest extent feasible or (2) until activity is safe).  Philosopher Derek Parfit, 
in an effort to make sense of Scanlon’s argument against aggregation, discusses the 
“Disproportional View”: “Lesser burdens should be discounted, since their moral importance is 
less than proportional to their size.”  Derek Parfit, Justifiability to Each Person, 16 RATIO 368, 
379 (2003).  Parfit ultimately rejects this view, and concludes, more generally, that Scanlon 
“rejects utilitarianism for the wrong reason.  Utilitarians go astray, not by letting the numbers 
count, but by ignoring or rejecting all principles of distributive justice.”  Id. at 379–80. 
 105. For example, suppose n=2: 
  D is negligent if and only if B  < 2 x ( P x L ) 
Compare this with the ordinary BPL test: 
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Third, she can adopt a hierarchy of interests, prioritizing the 
protection of some interests over the protection of others.  This 
approach might express deontological principles even if the interests 
that are balanced are the Learned Hand factors B, P, and L.  Thus, 
with respect to “L,” arguably, property matters less than physical 
integrity, and economic interests matter the least.106  With respect to 
“B,” we might value loss of important social benefits more highly 
than loss of private benefits or more than financial costs.107  Insofar 
as we employ deontological criteria to prioritize interests within 
BPL, we depart from a simple utilitarian calculus.  On the other 
hand, prioritization can also express a pluralist, idealized conception 
of “utility.” 
Each of these possible solutions creates its own set of problems, 
however.  “Ignoring trivial benefits” requires us to define the 
threshold of triviality; presumably we need to relate triviality to some 
defensible baseline level of risk.108  The “thumb on the scale” 
prompts several questions: How heavy a “thumb”?  Why that precise 
weight?  For what categories of cases?  Instead of this approach, 
perhaps we would do better to start with a more justifiable set of 
social values that we should then directly balance, without any 
“thumb.”109 
 
B PL B<PL 
Ordinary test 
B<2PL 
Thumb 
49  50 Negl Negl 
60  50 Not negl Negl 
80  50 Not negl Negl 
100  50 Not negl Not negl 
 
The tests give different results in the two shaded rows.  For a similar analysis, see Geistfeld, 
supra note 104, at 147–49 (concluding that the “thumb,” n, should be precisely 2). 
 106. Of course, tort doctrine itself relegates economic and emotional interests to a lesser 
status, insofar as negligently inflicting these types of harms is not independently actionable 
(although they are sometimes recoverable if incident to physical harms). 
 107. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998) (declaring that 
whether liability would have a “negative effect on corporate earnings” or merely “would reduce 
employment in a given industry” should not be considered in the risk/utility calculus for design 
defect). 
 108. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 78, at 194–95.  For the argument that this type of 
“triviality” or “irrelevant utilities” argument ultimately collapses, see Norcross, supra note 3; 
Parfit, supra note 104. 
 109. See Simons, supra note 19, at 78–81. 
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With respect to hierarchies of interests, tort law does, and 
arguably should, remedy deprivations even of less important 
interests, including economic harms, especially when they follow 
from physical harms to person or property.  Moreover, to say that “in 
general” interest X is more important than interest Y is problematic.  
Even if this is often true, a much greater infringement on Y (the less 
weighty interest) can be more significant, morally and legally, than a 
much lesser infringement on X (the more weighty interest).110  
Losing a life due to another’s tort is indeed worse than losing a 
finger, which is worse than losing a day’s wages.  But the loss of a 
day, or an hour, of one’s life need not be valued more than the 
physical destruction of a factory.  And once we consider the very 
realistic possibility of precautions that avoid a tiny risk of infringing 
(more weighty) interest X in order to preserve a higher probability of 
not infringing or of furthering (less weighty) interest Y, this 
approach becomes even less plausible.111  Unless one endorses the 
extreme (and implausible) position that preventing any infringements 
of X should have absolute lexical priority over preventing any 
infringements of Y, these difficult questions of comparative value 
will persist. 
Finally, a critical question for any of these possible solutions is 
the question of when they should apply.  Are they understood to be a 
pervasive criterion of negligence, applicable in all contexts?  Or are 
they to be employed only in a subset of cases?  One plausible view is 
as follows: We should first identify the cases in which the 
presumptive negligence criterion should apply.  Either a qualified 
deontological or a qualified consequentialist criterion might be 
employed here.  This presumptive criterion might, for example, 
apply to all interactions in which there is either strict or approximate 
reciprocity of benefit and burden.  But we would then identify cases 
in which a more stringent criterion should apply—cases, for 
example, in which one party clearly obtains a unilateral benefit from 
the interaction. 
 
 110. See Perry, supra note 35, at 41; Simons, supra note 19, at 81–82. 
 111. Suppose the only medicine that will relieve a headache has a very tiny risk of causing 
personal injury or death.  Or consider carbonated beverages, which serve the drinker’s modest 
interest in quenching his thirst while enjoying the pleasurable sensation of carbonation, but at the 
risk of a tiny, realistically unavoidable risk of death from the bottle exploding. 
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Recall the question of whether the owners of an athletic field 
must use greater care in building a fence to protect people outside the 
park from harm, than in building a fence to protect spectators inside 
the park who benefit from the activity.  On the view just suggested, a 
qualified consequentialist or qualified deontological criterion is 
appropriate for determining the requisite degree of safety for those 
inside the park, while a “thumb on the scale” test (or some other 
more stringent variant) is appropriate for determining the requisite 
degree of safety that we should guarantee to those outside the park 
who do not obtain any significant benefit from the activity. 
3.  Consider individual risk but not population risk 
A third possible deontological answer to the problem of 
permissible tradeoffs is to allow tradeoffs, but only if the required 
precaution lowers the individual risk to those endangered.  On this 
approach, it is not sufficient that the precaution will lower the 
aggregate population risk.  As we will see, this approach is 
promising but seems to have only limited practical relevance in tort 
law. 
One important difference between some rights-based and 
contractualist approaches to risk, on the one hand, and a 
consequentialist approach, on the other, is the way in which 
regulatory policy addresses individual rather than population risk.  
Suppose an agency has sufficient funds to do only one of the 
following:112 
(1) Eliminate toxic chemicals that are present in high 
concentrations in Smallville and that create an incremental 
fatality risk of 1 in 1,000 for each of the small town’s 1,000 
residents; or 
(2) Eliminate toxic chemicals that are present in much 
lower concentrations in Big City’s waste dump and that 
create an incremental fatality risk of 2 in 100,000 for each 
of the city’s 100,000 residents. 
“In this sort of case, it is standardly suggested, ‘population risk’ 
considerations weigh in favor of cleaning up the [Big City] dump, 
while individual risk considerations weigh in favor of cleaning up the 
 
 112. The example is from Matthew Adler & Chris Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: 
Theory and Legal Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 355–56 (2006). 
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[Smallville] town dump.”113  If we clean up Big City, we can expect 
to save more lives in the total population (two rather than one).  By 
contrast, if instead we clean up Smallville, we protect those who are 
at much higher individual risk (1 in 1,000 rather than 1 in 50,000).  
Regulators might take one or the other, or both, of these types of risk 
into account (depending on the particular statutory mandate). 
Consequentialists tend to favor the population risk approach.  
What ultimately matters, they believe, is the bottom-line “body 
count,” the total number of injuries or deaths that could be prevented.  
Nonconsequentialists might also (or instead) value individual risk.114 
This debate has some relevance for tort law, and for the 
articulation of standards of permissible risk-imposition.  A 
consequentialist will again support the population risk approach, 
while a contractualist is more likely to support some version of the 
individual risk approach. 
For example, suppose I am driving an ambulance and must get 
to the hospital promptly in order to save my passenger’s life.  I must 
take either Road A or Road B.  I happen to know (this is an academic 
paper, after all) the following: 
ROAD A OR ROAD B? 
Road A: Four pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each has 
a 10 percent chance of dying if I speed by them fast enough 
to save the person in the back of the ambulance. 
Road B: Twenty pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each 
has a 3 percent chance of dying if I speed by them. 
 
The expected death toll on Road A is 0.4; on Road B, it is 0.6.  
What should I do? 
If population risk controls, I should take Road A; for Road B 
can be expected (over enough similar cases) to result in a 50 percent 
higher death rate.  If individual risk controls, I should take Road B, 
since it is morally more problematic to impose a 10 percent risk of 
death on a population than to impose a 3 percent risk on a 
 
 113. Id.; see also Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY 
& ENV’T 325 (1996). 
 114. But cf. Matthew D. Adler, Against ‘Individual Risk’: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk 
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1246–47 (2005) (arguing that even a deontological 
perspective cannot justify the individual risk approach). 
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population.  Because contractualists focus on the burden for each 
individual, they are likely to support the individual risk approach.115 
This example might not be terribly compelling:  If it is purely a 
matter of chance whether a pedestrian happens to be on Road A or 
Road B, and if the risk of harm is relatively low in either case, would 
he really care whether the ex ante risk happens to be much higher in 
one location?  Is the slight difference in risk really enough to trouble 
him?  But imagine this variation, where I must take either Road C or 
Road D: 
ROAD C OR ROAD D? 
Road C: Two pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each has 
a 50 percent chance of dying if I speed by them fast enough 
to save two people in the back of the ambulance. 
Road D: Twelve pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each 
has a 10 percent chance of dying if I speed by them (again, 
in order to save two people). 
 
The expected death toll on Road C is 1.0; on Road D, it is 1.2.  
What should I do? 
Here, the intuition seems especially strong that taking Road D is 
preferable to taking Road C, and this seems to support the individual 
risk approach.  Indeed, not only is Road C the less acceptable of the 
two road options, it might well be an impermissible option even if 
the other route, Road D, did not exist.  Taking Road C might be 
impermissible because creating such a high, concentrated risk to the 
two pedestrians might not justify the benefit of saving the life of the 
two ambulance passengers.116 
These examples suggest that at least when the individual risk is 
especially high, respect for the individual (on a contractualist or 
other nonconsequentialist account) might permit, or even require, a 
 
 115. However, if a contractualist considers only the ex post burden each individual suffers as 
morally relevant, not the ex ante chance of being burdened, she will reject this analysis. 
 116. If the reader does not share the view that taking Road C is impermissible even if there is 
no alternative Road D, he will likely consider it impermissible for the ambulance to take Road C* 
(a more extreme version of Road C), even if there is no alternative road: 
Road C*: Two pedestrians are on the sidewalk, each of whom has a 90 percent chance 
of dying if the ambulance speeds by. 
For further discussion, see Simons, supra note 19, at 65. 
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choice to minimize individual risk even at the expense of increasing 
population risk, i.e., even at the expense of increasing aggregate 
expected bad consequences. 
But how often do these considerations make a difference in 
negligence law?  Not often, I suspect.  Given the more typical, low-
level risks characteristic of most tort negligence cases, it is often 
plausible to assume that, for each individual, the aggregate benefits 
she obtains from all activities that expose her to approximately that 
level of risk exceed the aggregate risks.  If intrapersonal aggregation 
of this sort is a justifiable basis for permitting risky activity, then it 
will justify most low-level risks, whether understood as individual or 
population risk.  The choice between the risk approaches is unlikely 
to matter when the risks are extremely small, as in the Smallville v. 
Big City contrast.  The benefits to the people at risk are unlikely to 
vary enough to make the differential in risks decisive.  But when the 
difference in individual risks between the two endangered groups is 
great and the risks themselves are quite substantial (for example, at 
least 5 percent), then a differential in benefits between the groups 
might indeed make a difference to permissibility. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, let me say a few words about the Learned Hand 
test, then about the choice between qualified consequentialist and 
qualified deontological accounts of negligence. 
A.  Liberating the Learned Hand Test 
Advocates of efficiency analysis have hijacked the Learned 
Hand test, treating it as a self-evident formula for aggregating costs 
and benefits, often presuming a market valuation of the relevant 
interests, and typically ignoring distribution.  The Hand formula can 
be rescued from this sordid fate. 
How can it be rescued?  I have explored the question more fully 
elsewhere,117 so the answer here is brief.  To a significant extent, the 
formula can accommodate both sensitive consequentialist and tough-
minded deontological accounts of negligence, each of which is much 
more plausible than unqualified consequentialist or unqualified 
deontological accounts.  The formula is sufficiently general to 
 
 117. See Simons, Hand Formula, supra note 25. 
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accommodate these different justifications for tort negligence 
liability. 
However, a more careful articulation of the formula should 
emphasize the social value of the relevant interests.  To be 
defensible, the utilitarian account should be idealized, and to a 
greater extent than the current Restatement (Third) draft provides.118 
Moreover, in cases of advertent negligence, the Hand formula 
factors should be part of a jury instruction, in order to discipline and 
guide decision-making more effectively than the widely used, 
extremely vague “reasonable care under the circumstances” standard.  
In the context of corporate liability for negligence, it might be 
appropriate to require even more specific criteria, as the Restatement 
(Third) and many jurisdictions now do when defining products 
liability design and warning defects. 
At the same time, an abstract BPL test is often highly 
misleading.  Where possible, more context-specific standards should 
be articulated, specifying the scope of the duty and the criteria for 
breach of duty.  Moreover, the distribution of risks and benefit is 
absolutely essential to understanding the permissibility of risky 
activity.  In suitable cases, the jury instruction should also require 
explicit consideration of who benefits from the activity, and who is 
most exposed to its risks. 
Once we develop a defensible formula or criterion for when 
tradeoff is permissible, then we should not only allow tradeoffs, but, 
in a significant range of cases, encourage actors to make the tradeoffs 
explicitly.  To this extent, Viscusi’s complaint, noted in the 
introduction, is correct: if an explicit tradeoff of values is what the 
most defensible moral and legal theory requires, then it is often 
sensible to require the actor to make that tradeoff explicitly. (The 
notorious Ford Pinto case is not a persuasive counterexample, for it 
does not prove the moral unacceptability of all forms of analysis that 
 
 118. See id. at 925, 936–39.  Notice that L (the harm to the victim, if the precaution is not 
taken) is especially difficult to value when it refers to loss of life.  However, given the 
impressionable and imprecise nature of any actual balancing test in the tort context, this is not too 
problematic.  Still, it might be appropriate for government to approve a presumptive value of life 
for regulatory purposes, and to employ that value in the tort context as well.  (The value should be 
subject to modification in light of qualitative aspects of the risk.) 
  Of course, this value would be employed ex ante, in judging whether the precaution 
should have been taken.  It is a separate question how the law should compensate for loss of life 
ex post. 
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trade off the advantages and the disadvantages of taking a 
precaution.  Instead, it reveals the problems with an unduly low 
valuation of human life.119) 
If the explicit decision to proceed with a risky activity or to omit 
a precaution is made properly, with a socially acceptable balancing 
of the relevant factors, then the activity or omission is permissible.  
The fact that a conscious tradeoff decision was made does not 
amount to fault.  Even if the explicit decision to proceed with the 
activity or to omit a precaution is made improperly, for example by 
giving undue (excessive or insufficient) weight to certain factors or 
by not exploring alternatives carefully enough, the additional fact 
that the risk was created advertently rather than inadvertently does 
not necessarily mean that the actor is more at fault. 
B.  Choosing Between Qualified Consequentialist and  
Qualified Deontological Accounts of Negligence 
I have argued that we should reject unqualified consequentialist 
or deontological accounts of negligence, and should endorse 
qualified versions instead.  But what difference does it make whether 
we incorporate qualifications within a consequentialist or a 
deontological approach? 
Even if we idealize or qualify a value (such as B, P, or L) in the 
consequentialist analysis, the analysis still commits us to maximizing 
aggregate “amounts” of the value.  Some would still find that 
objectionable.  On the other hand, incorporating a distributive 
constraint within the consequentialist criterion partially addresses 
this concern.  However, if we adopt this solution, we might find it 
difficult to create a simple verbal formulation for the distribution-
sensitive criterion. 
At the same time, even a qualified deontological account might 
be unable to justify at least some risky activities that intuitively 
appear to be perfectly acceptable.  For example, if the deontological 
 
 119. The 1972 government study upon which the cost-benefit analysis was based assigned 
only $200,000 to the loss of a life, a low figure even adjusting for inflation since 1972.  See 
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1022.  Moreover, there is some question whether the cost of a 
precaution was also overstated, since the precaution that was quantified in the cost-benefit 
analysis, a post-sale installation of a shield, almost certainly would produce much higher 
aggregate costs over the entire fleet of Pintos than would the pre-sale precaution of properly 
investigating the proposed fuel tank placement in the first place and then developing and 
producing a safer initial design. 
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account permits only a narrow type of intrapersonal aggregation 
(permitting an act or activity to endanger someone only if his 
expected benefits from each act or activity, considered separately, 
exceed the ex ante risks), there remain activities in which at least 
some of the people exposed to the risk do not obtain a net benefit, 
even ex ante.  If we believe (as most of us do) that such activities can 
still be permissible, so long as the proportion of individuals who 
“lose out” on balance from the activity is sufficiently small, then we 
seem to be committed, to that extent, to a consequentialist 
justification. 
In the end, perhaps our considered intuitions about which 
instances of risk creation and risk imposition are permissible and 
which are impermissible, commit us to some sort of mixture or 
mutual accommodation of deontological and consequentialist 
principles.  Is such an accommodation theoretically incoherent?  If 
so, then perhaps we should revise some of our intuitions, or even 
abandon our commitment to coherence.  Better still, we should work 
even harder on developing a subtle, coherent, principled, and 
persuasive answer to this extraordinarily challenging question: when 
is it permissible to create a risk of harm to others? 
 
